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Patricia J. Youngblood* 
1981and1982, the years on which this Survey article focuses, 
did not see the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit presented with cases that commanded the attention of the 
world1 or touched the hearts and minds of America's international 
lawyers.2 The court did decide questions raising some of the most 
abiding issues of international law: foreign state immunity, the 
scope of the act of state doctrine, and the relation between treaty 
obligations and domestic law. Many of the cases also raised compli-
cated domestic issues regarding the allocation of power and respon-
sibility among the three branches of the United States government. 
The decisions reached by the Second Circuit on these interna-
tional and domestic issues, and particularly the reasoning that 
supported these decisions, often raised more questions than they 
answered. The court approached the task of deciding difficult 
questions in international law with an appreciation not only of the 
complexities of that law, but also of the fragile nature of the rela-
tionship between the United States and the world community. 
L BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA CASES: 
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
AND FOREIGN EXPROPRIATIONS 
The Second Circuit decided six cases8 on one day involving 
• Associate Professor, Albany Law School of Union University; J.D., Willamette 
University College of Law, 1978; L.L.M., Harvard Law School, 1980. 
1. See Youngblood, 1980 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit, 8 SYR. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. 159, 159-80 (1980) for a discussion of Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981). Dames & Moore involved the statutory and constitutional power of a United 
States President to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims 
of United States persons against Iran. President Carter had successfully won the release of 
the American hostages in Iran, in part, by agreeing to the termination of litigation. 
2. See Youngblood, supra note 1, at 212, for a discussion of Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Filartiga involved the issue of jurisdiction of federal courts 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act to hear and decide a claim based upon alleged torture con-
ducted by an agent of the Paraguayan government. 
3. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 




Published by SURFACE, 1983
2 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.10:1 
foreign expropriations and the act of state doctrine.4 All six cases, 
along with dozens before them,5 arose out of the revolution in Cuba 
in the late 1950's and the subsequent expropriation of American-
owned property in Cuba by the Cuban Government of Fidel 
Castro Ruz. Many of the events surrounding the revolution and 
expropriation form a common factual basis out of which each of 
the cases arose. Similarly, the judicial and political history of the 
act of state doctrine formed the foundation of the court's opinion 
in many of the cases. These two common elements are addressed 
before discussion of the individual cases. 
The Cuban revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Batista 
regime and the installation of a new government on January l, 
1959. The new government enacted numerous statutes designed to 
accomplish two general goals: to centralize all means of production 
in Cuba in the hands of the new government, and to restrict and 
curtail the role of foreign enterprise in the Cuban economy.6 
Within eighteen months after the installation of the new gov-
ernment, relations between the United States and Cuba had ser-
iously deteriorated. On July 6, 1960, Cuba enacted Law No. 851 
authorizing the President and Prime Minister of Cuba to order the 
forced expropriation of the assets or firms of United States citi-
zens, both natural and juridical. On September 17, 1960, the Cuban 
government, pursuant to Law No. 851, ordered the expropriation 
and nationalization of the Cuban branches of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, the First National Bank of Boston, and the First National 
City Bank of New York. On October 13, 1960, virtually all remain-
ing private banks were nationalized.7 
81-984); First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895 
(2d Cir.1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 579 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Manufactures Trust 
Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d 
Cir. 1981). The last three cases were consolidated for argument and were decided in a single 
opinion. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 9-22. 
5. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1019, on 
remand, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd 406 U.S. 759 (1972), on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), on remand sub nom. Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). 
6. See H.L. MATTHEWS, REVOLUTION IN CUBA 112-22 (1975). 
7. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
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Banco N acional de Cuba, a party to most of these cases, has 
functioned as the central bank of Cuba since 1948.8 Prior to the 
Revolution, the bank was fifty percent government owned. After 
the Revolution, the bank was extensively involved in the restruc-
turing of the Cuban banking industry, including the expropriation 
and nationalization of the branches of United States banks. Some-
time after being given control of all remaining private banks, Banco 
Nacional became wholly o~ned and operated by the Cuban gov-
ernment. 
Because the expropriation and nationalization of these banks 
was by order of the Cuban government, the act of state doctrine is 
implicated in litigation arising out of those acts. The act of state 
doctrine's classic formulation is found in Underhill v. Hernandez.9 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of 
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed 
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.10 
Underhill, and cases decided for decades after it, 11 treated the 
act of state doctrine as required by internationally accepted princi-
ples of law and comity between states. The first major dissatisfac-
tion with the act of state doctrine as formulated in Underhill came 
in two opinions of the Second Circuit authored by Judge Learned 
Hand.12 In the first case, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe 
Anonyme (Bernstein J),13 Judge Hand applied the act of state doc-
trine to foreclose judicial inquiry into the validity of expropriation 
of the plaintiff's property by the Nazis. In Bernstein v. N. V. 
N ederlandsche-A merikaansche Stoomvaart-M aatschappy (Bern-
stein JJ),14 Judge Hand refused to apply the act of state doctrine 
because the State Department had requested that the doctrine not 
8. Id. 
9. 168 u .s. 250 (1897). 
10. Id. at 252. 
11. See, e.g. , Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 349 (1909). 
12. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme (Bernstein I), 163 F.2d 246 (2d 
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappy (Bernstein II), 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). 
13. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). 
14. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). 
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be applied in the case.15 Thus, at least in the Second Circuit's view, 
application of the act of state doctrine was not compelled by inter-
national law but was at least partially linked to the foreign rela-
tions interests of the United States government as represented by 
the executive branch. 
The notion that the act of state doctrine was founded on 
something other than the dictates of international law and comity 
was expressly adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 16 
We do not believe that [the act of state] doctrine is compelled 
either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority ... or by 
some principle of international law .... The text of the Constitu-
tion does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not ir-
revocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the 
validity of foreign acts of state. 
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitu-
tional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships be-
tween branches of government in a system of separation of 
powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to 
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of 
international relations.17 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the 
application of the doctrine in an individual case was a matter of 
judicial discretion rather than legal mandate. Having recognized 
the source of the act of state doctrine, the Court further identified 
the appropriate focus in determining whether the doctrine ought 
to be applied. The relevant concern, the Court stated, is whether 
the judiciary's "engagement in the task of passing on the validity 
of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this coun-
try's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-
tions as a whole in the international sphere."18 
Sabbatino, like the Second Circuit cases decided in 1981, 
arose out of the Cuban revolution and the expropriations that 
followed. Having stated that "the greater the degree of codifica-
tion or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, 
15. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi 
Forced Transfers, Dept. of State Press Release No. 296 (Apr. 27, 1949), 20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592, 
593 (1949). 
16. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
17. Id. at 421-23. 
18. 376 U.S. at 423. 
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the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions re-
garding it,"19 the Court concluded "[t]here are few if any issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as 
the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of 
aliens."20 The Court found it "difficult to imagine the courts of this 
country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more 
sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various mem-
bers of the community of nations."21 Thus, regardless of whether· 
an expropriation, such as that undertaken by the Cuban govern-
ment, was offensive to the public policy of this country, the Court 
concluded that "both the national interest and progress towards 
the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are best 
served by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm 
of its application." 22 
A. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,23 the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided two issues with major 
impact on the continuing evolution of the act of state doctrine and 
the role of United States courts in deciding cases arising out of 
foreign expropriation. Banco Nactional brought suit against Chase 
Manhattan in the district court for the Southern District of New 
York to recover in excess of $9.7 million. This amount represented 
deposits allegedly owed by Chase Manhattan and the proceeds 
Chase Manhattan had received from the sale of collateral that had 
secured a loan to the predecessor of Banco N acional. Chase 
Manhattan did not contest the validity of the claim. Rather, Chase 
Manhattan counterclaimed, alleging inter alia that its branch 
banks, expropriated by the Cuban government in violation of in-
ternational law, were valued at more than $8.6 million. Although 
the total value of Chase Manhattan's counterclaims exceeded Ban-
co Nacional's claim, the former did not request affirmative relief 
but rather sought dismissal of Banco Nacional's claim.24 
19. Id. at 428. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 430. 
22. Id. at 437. 
23. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). 
24. Id. at 879. Chase Manhattan asserted a total of four counterclaims. In addition to 
its claim for the value of its branches based on the Cuban government's violation of interna-
tional law, the bank stated an alternative counterclaim for the value of the branches based 
on an implied contract theory, and two counterclaims in its capacity as trustee for certain 
5
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The district court held that, for the purposes of Chase Man-
hattan's counterclaim, Banco Nacional was the alter ego of the 
Cuban government, that Chase Manhattan's counterclaim was jus-
ticiable, and that Chase Manhattan was entitled to a set off in the 
amount of $6.9 million.25 Included in this amount was a damage 
award exceeding $1.4 million representing the "going concern" 
value of Chase Manhattan's Cuban branches. Because Chase Man-
hattan had not disputed the claims against it, judgment was 
entered against it for approximately $2.9 million. 
Both parties appealed. Banco N acional asserted that the dis-
trict court had erred in adjudicating Chase Manhattan's counter-
claim. Banco Nacional argued that this counterclaim was barred 
by the act of state doctrine. In addition, Banco N acional argued 
that the amount of compensation was a nonjusticiable political 
question and that, in any event, the district court had overvalued 
Chase Manhattan's Cuban assets. Chase Manhattan argued that 
the "going concern" valuation of its branches by the district court 
was too low. 26 
The Second Circuit first considered the justiciability of Chase 
Manhattan's counterclaim and held that the counterclaim was jus-
ticiable.27 While recognizing that the reasoning of Sabbatino would 
appear to require the opposite conclusion, the court found its 
holding of justiciability supported, and indeed compelled, by the 
Supreme Court's post-Sabbatino decision in First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba (Citibank). 28 In Citibank, the Sup-
reme Court held that the act of state doctrine was not a bar to ad-
judication of the merits of Citibank's counterclaim for damages 
arising out of the expropriation of its Cuban branches. The Court's 
American investors. Only the first counterclaim is of significant interest, and thus only it is 
discussed in this Survey. 
25. 505 F. Supp. 412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
26. 658 F.2d at 880. 
27. Id. at 881. 
28. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Citibank involved facts nearly identical to those in the instant 
case. Citibank sought a setoff for the expropriation of its Cuban branches up to the amounts 
sought by Banco Nacional for deposits and excess proceeds from the sale of collateral for a 
loan. The Second Circuit ruled that the act of state doctrine barred adjudication of 
Citibank's claim. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). The United States Supreme Court directed that 
the Second Circuit reconsider in light of a State Department letter advising that the foreign 
relations interests of the United States would not be injured by adjudication of the 
counterclaim. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). The Second Circuit adhered to its original holding. 442 
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision. 406 U.S. at 
759. 
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vote was split five to four and the opinion is quite complex; thus it 
will not be treated in depth here.29 Of those justices holding that 
the act of state doctrine was not a bar, three based their decision 
on the fact that the executive branch had represented to the Court 
that the application of the doctrine would not advance American 
foreign policy interests;30 one justice opined that a foreign 
sovereign plaintiff should not be able to invoke the doctrine to bar 
a counterclaim,31 and one justice indicated a dissatisfaction with 
Sabbatino, stating that the act of state doctrine should be applied 
only when failure to do so would interfere with "delicate foreign 
relations conducted by the political branches."32 The dissenters be-
lieved that Sabbatino was correct in recognizing the proper dis-
tribution of functions between the branches on foreign affairs mat-
ters. In the dissenters' opinion, the determination of the legality of 
a foreign sovereign's act within its own territory, when that act in-
volved an area of customary law upon which states had not reached 
a consensus, was a political question from which the judiciary 
should abstain. 33 
The Second Circuit, in Banco Nacional v. Chase Manhattan, 
interpreted the views of the Citibank majority and "arrived at the 
following phenomenological rule." 34 
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a ... letter advis-
ing the courts that it believes [the] act of state doctrine need not 
be applied, (2) there is no showing that an adjudication of the 
claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and (3) the 
claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of 
counterclaim and does not exceed the value of the sovereign's 
claim, adjudication of the counterclaim for expropriation of the 
defendant's property is not barred by the act of state doctrine.35 
The court found all three conditions satisfied in Banco Nacional v. 
Chase Manhattan and thus affirmed the district court's holding 
29. For an extended discussion of Citibank, see Lowenfeld, Act of State and Depart-
ment of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 
(1972); Note, Act of State, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (1973); and Note, Act of State Doctrine, 6 
VAND. J, TRANSNAT'L L. 272 (1972-73). 
30. 406 U.S. at 764. 
31. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J ., concurring). 
32. Id. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 787-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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that the act of state doctrine was not a bar to the adjudication of 
the counterclaim. 
The court also affirmed the district court's determination that 
the issue of damages arising out of the counterclaim was justiciable. 
While recognizing "that it is difficult to state precisely what inter-
national law requires regarding damages,"36 the court found sup-
port in Citibank for its decision. In Citibank the Supreme Court had 
clearly implied that the amount of damages was to be used as a 
measure of the separate justiciability of the counterclaim itself.36a 
Thus, the Second Circuit argued, the justiciability of the damage 
issue necessarily followed because the rule for determining 
justiciability "necessarily contemplated that valuation issues were 
to be decided."37 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the standard of compen-
sation to be employed in valuing Chase Manhattan's counterclaim. 
"We begin with the recognition that our task in determining the 
standard ... is to apply principles of international, not merely 
local, law. A review of this area convinces us that there are 
several strongly espoused views, and that international law is far 
from clear."38 The court's focus was necessarily even more limited. 
There is no treaty recognized by both the United States and Cuba 
controlling the issue and therefore the court's only source was 
customary international law.39 
As a source of international law, custom refers to the habitual 
behavior of states acting under the conviction that such behavior 
is obligatory or proper under international law. Custom requires 
uniformity in the practice of states .... It establishes an interna-
tional norm when such uniformity of practice becomes sufficiently 
widespread that it creates reasonable community-wide expecta-
tions associated with legal prescription.40 
36. Id. at 885. 
36a. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 887-88 (citations omitted). 
39. The International Court of Justice has stated the requirements necessary to 
establish that a norm has reached the level of customary international law. "The Party 
which relies on custom ... must prove that this custom ... is in accordance with a constant 
and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression 
of a right .... "Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 l.C.J. 266, 276 (Judgment of Nov. 20). 
40. Note, International Law: An "Appropriate" Compensation Standard for Na-
tionalized Property: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 66 MINN. L. REV. 
931, 933 (1982). 
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The Second Circuit focused on four standards of compensa-
tion that might reach the status of customary international law. 
First, the court discussed the "orthodox position," to which the 
United States has historically been committed, which requires 
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation.41 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations expanded on the requirements 
under this standard. Compensation must be paid within a 
reasonable time, must be in an amount equal to the full value of 
that which is taken, and must be paid in an exchange medium 
realizable by the victim State. 42 The court found "some interna-
tional support" for the "orthodox position."43 
The court next focused on the standard that departs most 
radically from the "orthodox position." This is in essence, a "non-
standard," espoused by the Soviet bloc,44 which recognizes no legal 
obligation to pay any compensation whatsoever. The court also 
recognized the existence of intermediate views, particularly those 
calling for a measure of partial compensation. 45 These views 
developed in response to large-scale expropriations where the in-
terests in providing compensation for expropriated property had 
to be balanced against the social and economic interests of the ex-
propriating State, whose economy might be crippled by an overly 
burdensome expropriation debt. 
The major discussion by the court concerned the efforts of the 
United Nations to reach a consensus on an appropriate standard of 
compensation. The discussion began with an analysis of the debate 
over, and resulting language of, Resolution 1803, entitled "Declara-
tion on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources."46 Para-
graph 4 of that resolution provides: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be 
based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the na-
tional interest which are recognized as overriding purely individ-
ual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases 
41. 658 F.2d at 888. 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 188 
(1965). 
43. 658 F .2d at 888. 
44. See, e.g., 17 U.N. GAOR C.2 (846th mtg.) at 297, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR. 846 (1962); 
Rafat, Compensation for Expropriated Property in Recent International Law, 14 VILL. L. 
REV. 199, 202 (1969). 
45. 658 F .2d at 889. 
46. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). 
9
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the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance 
with the rules inf orce in the State taking such measures in the 
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international 
law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise 
to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking 
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by 
sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the 
dispute should be made through arbitration or international ad-
judication.46a 
Although the Soviet bloc countries and Cuba abstained, the vote 
in favor of Resolution 1803 was overwhelming.47 The Court of Ap-
peals briefly mentioned a problem of interpretation inherent in 
Resolution 1803. The resolution provides that "appropriate com-
pensation" must be paid "in accordance with international law." 
The United States has consistently maintained that this requires 
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation." It is clear, how-
ever, that this view was not shared by the General Assembly. 48 In 
1973 and 197 4 the General Assembly passed two resolutions con-
taining language which suggested that the United States' view 
had been rejected by the General Assembly. Resolution 3281, the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,49 declared the 
right of States to nationalize or expropriate foreign property. 
Chapter II, Article 2, Paragraph 2(c) of that resolution provides 
that appropriate compensation should, · rather than shall, be paid 
and omitted any reference to compensation requirements under 
international law.50 The final vote on Resolution 3281 was 120 in 
favor, 6 against, with 10 abstentions.51 Cuba voted in favor of the 
resolution; the United States voted against it.51a 
Resolution 3171 was passed by the General Assembly in 1973. 52 
It affirmed the principle of nationalization as an expression of 
sovereignty and stated that this principle "implies that each State 
is entitled to determine the amount of compensation and the mode 
of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be set-
tled in accordance with the national legislation of each State carry-
46a. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added). 
47. The vote was 87 in favor, 2 against, 12 abstentions. 17(3) U.N. GAOR (1194th plen. 
mtg.) at 1134, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1194 (1962). 
48. See 658 F .2d at 889-90. 
49. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
50. Id. at 52. 
51. 29 U.N. GAOR (2315th plen. mtg.) at 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2315 (1974). 
51a. Id. 
52. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supo. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) . 
. 
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ing out such measures."53 This resolution was approved by the 
General Assembly by a vote of 108 in favor, 1 against, with 16 
abstentions. Cuba voted in favor, the United States abstained.54 
The Second Circuit summarized its discussion of these resolu-
tions: 
This overview of the actions of members of the General 
Assembly presents at best a confused and confusing picture as to 
what the consensus may be as to the responsibilities of an expro-
priating nation to pay "appropriate compensation," and just 
what that term may mean. The resolutions, the view of commen-
tators, and the positions taken by individual states or blocs are 
varied, diverse, and not easily reconciled.55 
Having thoroughly articulated the available standards and the 
lack of an international consensus regarding them, the Second Cir-
cuit selected a standard with relative ease. "The instant case ... 
presents fewer difficulties than some we might envision insofar as 
the selection of a standard of compensation is concerned."56 The 
court had identified four alternatives and concluded that two of 
them, no compensation and partial compensation, did not reflect 
international law. The court concluded the other two, appropriate 
compensation and full compensation, were probably the same stan-
dard in the instant case.57 Thus, while "[i]t may well be the consen-
sus of nations that full compensation need not be paid 'in all cir-
cumstances' ,"58 the possibility of full compensation is not fore-
closed by the "appropriate compensation" standard. "Although 
the award we approve for Chase is less than it seeks and more 
than Banco N acional would wish, we nevertheless view it as full 
compensation for Chase's loss, and neither more nor less than is 
appropriate in the circumstances."59 
The only determination of the district court with which the 
Court of Appeals disagreed was the valuation of Chase Manhattan's 
branches as "going concerns."60 A "going concern value" refers to 
"the proposition that the prospective buyer of a business will be 
53. Id . para. 3. 
54. Id. 
55. 658 F.2d at 891. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 892. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 892-93. 
60. Id. at 893. 
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willing to pay a premium over the book value of the assets in the ex-
pectation that the earnings of the business will continue .... "61 
The court concluded that even if Chase Manhattan's branches had 
not been nationalized, there was very little possibility that they 
had the future earnings potential upon which "going concern" 
value is based.62 Chase Manhattan was therefore entitled to an 
award excluding the "going concern" value.63 
The Second Circuit faced two difficult problems in Banco Na-
cional v. Chase Manhattan, one flowing directly from the resolution 
of the other. The first problem was determining whether the act 
of state doctrine served to bar Chase Manhattan's counterclaim. 
Sabbatino suggested it did, not because of the procedural posture 
of the claim or because of the executive branch's response to the 
claim, but due to the nature of the claim itself. Because the inter-
national legal community had not reached a consensus regarding 
compensation for expropriation, nor agreed on the illegality or le-
gitimacy of expropriation itself, claims arising out of expropria-
tions of the kind carried out in Cuba were not justiciable in United 
States courts. Citibank seemed to change the focus of the doc-
trine, at least in expropriation cases. The right to expropriate 
seems to be clearly established by General Assembly Resolutions 
1803 and 3281. The standard to be employed in measuring compen-
sation, however, seems as unclear as it was in 1964. Despite this, 
the Second Circuit's tripartite rule, extrapolated from Citibank, 
results in a finding of justiciability even in the absence of a cus-
tomary rule of law establishing an international legal standard. 
The court's molding of the majority and concurring opinions in 
Citibank allowed it to hold that the act of state doctrine was not a 
bar here. The court therefore was forced to face the compensation 
issue. 
The court's resolution of the compensation issue can be criti-
cized on at least two grounds. First, it gave precedence to Resolu-
tion 1803's "appropriate compensation" standard, which the 
United States had supported and from which Cuba had abstained, 
and gave little weight to Resolution 3281, for which Cuba voted 
and against which the United States voted. Customary rules of in-
61. Id. 
62. This was especially true in that one month after the taking of Chase Manhattan's 
branches, Law No. 891 prohibited any further banking transactions with private banks. 658 
F.2d at 893. 
63. Id. at 894. This reduced the amount of the setoff from $6,904,870 to $5,478,270. 
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ternational law generally are not binding on those who consistent-
ly object to them,64 suggesting the United States is not bound by 
Resolution 3281. These rules, arguably, are binding on those who 
do not object, thus suggesting that Cuba is bound by Resolution 
1803, yet this distinction seems too weak to support the court's 
holding. Second, the court's conclusion that the standards of full and 
appropriate compensation lead to essentially equivalent results, is 
troubling in the instant case in light of the court's failure to ex-
plain what features of the case led the court to this conclusion. 
Thus, Banco Nacional v. Chase Manhattan may not provide great 
precedential value for later cases raising issues of compensation 
for exporpriated property. 
B. BANCO PARA EL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE CUBA V. 
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK 
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First National 
City Bank (Bancec)65 is not, strictly speaking, a case concerning the 
act of state doctrine. Nevertheless, because it concerns an issue 
that might be linked to future act of state cases, it is included in 
this part of the Survey. 
Bancec was organized under the laws of Cuba in 1960 to act as 
an official autonomous credit institution for foreign trade. It was 
given juridical capacity and capital of its own.66 On August 12, 
1960 Bancec entered into written agreements to purchase sugar 
from the National Agrarian Reform Institute, an agency of the 
Cuban government, and to sell the sugar to the Cuban Canadian 
Sugar Company. The agreement between Bancec and the sugar 
company was supported by an irrevocable letter of credit in favor 
of Bancec issued by First National City Bank (Citibank), which 
Bancec assigned to Banco Nacional de Cuba for collection. Banco 
Nacional eventually called upon Citibank to pay nearly $200,000 on 
the letter of credit. Citibank, whose branches had been nation-
alized67 days before Banco Nacional's call on the letter of credit, 
credited the amount to the account of Banco N acional but refused 
to pay it. Instead, Citibank applied it against the amount Citibank 
64. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 l.C.J. 116, 138-39 (Judgment of Dec. 18). 
65. 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 936 (1982), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 
4820 (U.S. June 17, 1983) (No. 81-984). 
66. Id. at 915. 
67. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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believed it had lost through the expropriation.68 Bancec then 
brought the instant action against Citibank. Citibank did not dis-
pute the validity of the claim but counterclaimed for losses re-
sulting from the expropriation of its branches. Because Citibank's 
alleged losses far exceeded Bancec's claim, Citibank sought dis-
missal of the complaint. Citibank did not seek an affirmative 
award. 
The trial court held that Citibank's counterclaim was justifia-
ble and dismissed Bancec's complaint on the merits.68a Bancec ap-
pealed, arguing that Bancec was not the alter ego of the Cuban 
government for purposes of Citibank's counterclaim, and that 
even if it were, the counterclaims were nonjustifiable under the 
act of state doctrine. Bancec further argued that Citibank had 
already been compensated for its losses by setoffs in previous liti-
gation. 69 
The district court rejected Bancec's assertion that it was not 
the alter ego of the Cuban government.70 The trial judge reasoned 
that because Bancec's capital had been contributed by the Cuban 
government and because Bancec had no other function than to 
manage the export of commodities for that government, it was a 
creature of the Cuban government and was engaged in a state 
function. 71 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the 
district court's description of Bancec's function but rejected its 
conclusion that Bancec was, by virtue of that function, the alter 
ego of the Cuban government.72 
As a general matter, we start with the proposition that an in-
strumentality of a government is not necessarily an alter ego of 
that government for all purposes. If the instrumentality has 
been created as a separate and distinct juridical entity under the 
law of the state that owns it, we will normally respect its inde-
pendent identity for a number of purposes.73 
The court then stated the crucial distinction between this case and 
earlier cases holding Banco N acional to be the alter ego of the 
68. 658 F.2d at 915. 
68a. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
69. 658 F.2d at 917. 
70. 505 F. Supp. 412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
71. Id. 
72. 658 F.2d at 917. 
73. Id. at 918. 
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Cuban government:74 "We will ... ignore the statutory distinction 
between the state and its instrumentality when the subject mat-
ter of the countercl,aim assertible against the state is state con-
duct in which the instrumentality had a key role."15 In its 1973 
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank,16 
the Second Circuit had held Banco N acional to be the alter ego of 
the Cuban government. The court explained in Bancec that this 
holding was based upon the pivotal fact that the counterclaim in 
that case was based on the acts of expropriation which had been 
principally performed by the very instrumentality that was party 
to the case.77 The issue, therefore, is not whether the state and its 
instrumentality could be considered alter egos in general, but 
whether they were alter egos in the specific act of expropriation.78 
The claim in Bancec was a purely commercial one, characterized 
by the court as having no connection with the revolution or expro-
priation.79 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.79a Although the 
Court acknowledged that "government instrumentalities as 
juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign 
should normally be treated as such" 79b it held that, under the in-
stant circumstances, the separate juridical status of Bancec should 
be ignored.79c .. The Court reached this conclusion after describing 
in considerable detail the relationship among Bancec, the Govern-
ment of Cuba, Banco Nacional, and other government-owned in-
strumentalities. Of particular importance to the Court was the 
fact that Bancec was dissolved shortly after it instituted this 
action in 1961.79d Its capital was divided between Banco Nacional 
and branches of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Any claims 
"peculiar to the banking business" possessed by Bancec were 
vested in Banco N acional and its trade functions were assigned to 
74. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
75. 658 F.2d at 918 (emphasis added). 
76. 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). 
77. 658 F.2d at 918. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 919. 
79a. First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 51 
U.S.L.W. 4820 (1983). 
79b. Id. at 4824-25. 
79c. Id. at 4826. 
79d. Id. at 4821. 
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the Ministry of Foreign Trade. By a court-approved stipulation in 
July of 1961, the parties agreed to substitute, as plaintiff, the 
Republic of Cuba for Bancec. The complaint never was amended to 
reflect the change.79e The Court noted the district court's finding 
that Bancec's claim devolved to either the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
or Banco Nacional, two parties that might be held liable for the ex-
propriations at issue here.79r Thus, the Court does not appear to re-
ject the standard by which the Second Circuit decided in Bancec's 
favor79g but rather reaches a different conclusion based upon the 
application of that standard to the instant facts. 
The Second Circuit's holding in Bancec and the Supreme 
Court's opinion reversing have a direct impact on the availability 
of counterclaim relief for United States defendants who lost pro-
perty through the Cuban expropriations. Because the following 
case involves the same issue as was decided in Bancec, discussion 
of the precise effect of the court's holding appears after the discus-
sion of that case. 
C. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA V. CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK 
TRUST COMPANY 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust 
Co. (Chemical Bank),80 decided three unconsolidated appeals arising 
out of the Cuban expropriation of the Cuban Electric Company.81 
Cuban Electric was a United States corporation, organized under 
the laws of Florida and owned by United States nationals. It 
operated an electric utility in Cuba, where substantially all of its 
assets were located. Each of the three defendants in the cases de-
cided by Chemical Bank loaned money to Cuban Electric in 1958 and 
1959.82 In 1960, the Cuban assets of Cuban Electric were national-
ized.83 The loans made by the three defendant banks were never 
repaid. 
79e. Id. at 4822. 
79f. Id. at 4826. 
79g. Id. n.22. 
80. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981). 
81. Id. at 905. The other cases decided in Chemical Bank were Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Manufacturers Trust Co. and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co. Id. at 903. 
82. Id. at 907. 
83. Id. The nationalization was ordered in Resolution No. l, dated August 6, 1960, pur-
suant to Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960. Resolution 1 states in relevant part: 
WE RESOLVE: 
First: There is hereby ordered the nationalization through compulsory expropria-
16
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At approximately the same time it nationalized Cuban Elec-
tric, Cuba nationalized all private banks within its territory. Some 
of these banks were foreign-owned; others, including those here 
relevant, were Cuban corporations, domiciled in Cuba, and ap-
parently owned by Cubans.84 Two months after the nationalization 
of these banks, Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Trust and Irving 
Trust, all defendants here, looked to the accounts of the previous-
ly privately-owned Cuban banks to offset the loans they had made 
to Cuban Electric. The three United States banks refused the re-
quests of Banco N acional to release these accounts. 
Banco Nacional sued to recover the money that was withheld. 
One claim, asserted against Chemical Bank only, sought to recover 
Banco Nacional's own deposit accounts; the other claims, asserted 
against all three banks, sought recovery of the deposits of the na-
tionalized private banks.85 Each defendant counterclaimed assert-
ing that the debt owed to it by Cuban Electric exceeded the 
amount of Banco N acional' s claim. 85a Each also moved for summary 
judgment. 86 
The trial court dismissed on the merits Banco N acional' s 
claims asserted as successor-in-interest to the private banks. The 
court held that the expropriation of those banks by Cuba was inef-
fective to transfer title to assets in the United States. 87 As a 
result, the court dismissed as moot all counterclaims asserted in 
tion and, consequently, in appropriation in favor of the Cuban State, with absolute 
right of ownership, of all properties and entities in the national territory and the 
rights and interests attaching to the operation of said properties and entities, 
belonging to juridical persons who are nationals of the United States of America 
or who operate entities in which the majority interest is in the hands of 
Americans, as follows: 
1. Compania Cubana de Electricidad [Cuban Electric]. 
• • • • • 
Second: Consequently, it is hereby declared that the Cuban State is subrogated in 
the place and stead of the juridicial persons listed in the preceding paragraph with 
respect to the properties, rights and interests mentioned as well as the assets and 
liabilities comprising the capital of the entities referred to. 
Third: It is hereby declared that these compulsory expropriations are effected 
because of necessity and public utility and in the national interest as set forth in 
the "Whereas" clauses of this Resolution. 
658 F .2d at 907. 
84. Id. at 906. 
85. Id. at 905. 
85a. Id. 
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response to Banco Nacional's claims. The court allowed Banco Na-
cional's claim made in its own right, and allowed Chemical Bank's 
counterclaim. 88 
Both parties appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed.88a 
The court first turned to the issue of Banco Nacional's right to sue 
as successor-in-interest to the private Cuban banks, an issue on 
which both parties had urged a reversal of the trial court's 
holding. The standard to be applied to such extraterritorial at-
tempts to transfer title to assets located in the United States was 
articulated in Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank.89 In 
that case, the court held: 
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the 
principle of judicial refusal of examination applied only to a taking 
by a foreign sovereign of property within its own territory ... ; 
when property confiscated is within the United States at the 
time of the attempted confiscation, our courts will give effect to 
acts of state "only if they are consistent with the policy and law 
of the United States."90 
The attempted expropriation of property located in the United 
States violates United States law or policy if the prior owner has 
not been fairly compensated and protests the taking.91 
The court then turned to the justiciability of the counter-
claims asserted against Banco N acional. Banco N acional argued 
that it was an improper defendant as to claims arising out of the 
expropriation of Cuban Electric since it had no role in that partic-
88. Id. at 908. 
88a. Id. 
89. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). 
90. Id.at 51 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 46 (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) (citations omitted). 
91. 658 F.2d at 908. "In the present case, there appears to be no reason at this late 
time to invoke the act of state doctrine to bar the court from recognizing Banco Nacional's 
right to sue as successor to the Private Banks .... [T]he former owners of the Private Banks 
have lodged no protest, either by bringing suit to recover their United States property, or 
by seeking to intervene in Banco Nacional's suits .... Thus we cannot say that the effect 
this case of recognizing the Cuban nationalization of the Private Banks would violate United 
States policy. 
To the contrary, we conclude that allowing Banco Nacional to sue as successor here will 
further the goals of the United States because it will assist in providing funds in the United 
States from which American nationals who have valid claims against the government of 
Cuba may be compensated, at least in part, for their claims .... Were we not to recognize 
Banco Nacional's right to sue in the absence of any conflicting claims, the result apparently 
would be to cause the deposits to escheat to the State of New York, a result that cannot be 
said to further the established national policy." Id. at 909 (citations omitted). 
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ular expropriation. The Second Circuit agreed that Banco Na-
cional was not the alter ego of the Cuban government as to the 
particular expropriation of Cuban Electric and thus was not the 
proper defendant as to Chemical Bank's counterclaim. The court, 
however, reached the opposite conclusion as to those counter-
claims filed in response to Banco Nacional's claims as successor-in-
interest to the nationalized private banks.92 
As to Banco Nacional's claim in its own right, the court 
pointed to the fact that Banco Nacional did not participate suffi-
ciently in the expropriati~n of Cuban Electric to impute to Banco 
Nacional the acts of expropriation by the Cuban government. 
Similarly, there was no basis for imputing to the government the 
ownership interest of Banco N acional in its deposits with Chemical 
Bank. These deposits had never been the property of the Cuban 
government. Thus, the court found no grounds for equating the 
Cuban government with Banco Nacional, on either Banco 
Nacional's claim, or Chemical Bank's counterclaim.93 In light of the 
origin of Banco Nacional's claims as successor-in-interest to the 
private banks' accounts, the court concluded that Banco Nacional 
was pursuing those claims on behalf of the Cuban government, 
and therefore, counterclaims for the acts of the Cuban govern-
ment were proper. 94 
Despite finding the Cuban government the real party in in-
terest on these claims and counterclaims, the court refused to find 
these claims justiciable because the summary disposition of the 
claims by the court below did not provide a sufficient record to 
decide the issue of justiciability. The court reiterated the Chase 
Manhattan tripartite test95 for determining whether the act of 
state doctrine barred consideration of the counterclaims. The 
court was unable to determine on the record whether the first 
part of that test, the requirement that the executive branch ad-
vise the court that the act of state doctrine need not be applied, 
92. Id. at 910. 
93. Id. 
94. "Each of the complaints here filed alleged that Banco Nacional had a right to sue 
pursuant to Law No. 891, which expropriated the Private Banks .... [That law] provided 
that the nationalization and consequent 'award to the government of Cuba' would be 'carried 
out through Banco Nacional.' Thus the law vested ownership of the expropriated banks in the 
Cuban government, and by declaring Banco Nacional the legal successor to the private banks, 
made Banco Nacional a tribute or agent for the Cuban government.'' Id. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 35. 
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had been met. In both Chase Manhattan and Bancec,96 the trial 
court relied on a 1970 State Department letter that had been be-
fore the court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional.97 In 
that letter, the State Department supported adjudication of 
counterclaims against the Cuban government "in this or like 
cases."98 The Second Circuit identified several differences be-
tween the case before it, and the Chase, Bancec and Citibank 
cases. 
First, unlike Chase and [Bancec ], the claims pressed here by 
Banco Nacional as successor came to Banco Nacional as fruit of 
the Cuban expropriations; they are not claims developed in the 
ordinary course of its commercial activities, and they did not be-
long to Banco Nacional at the time of the expropriation of Cuban 
Electric. More important is the difference in the nature of the 
counterclaims. The Chase and [Bancec] cases involved counter-
claims for expropriation of those defendants' own property. The 
present counterclaims are based on expropriation not of defen-
dants' property but of the property of a corporation that simply 
owed money to the defendants; the defendants' legal premise is 
not that the expropriation violated their rights under interna-
tional law, but that there was a breach of an agreement by the 
Cuban government to pay assumed liabilities. We are not sure 
that the Executive Branch would consider these cases to be 
"like" Chase and [Bancec] ... ,99 
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
In Bancec the Second Circuit held that Citibank could not 
assert its counterclaim against Bancec because that instrumentali-
ty of the Cuban government did not play a principal role in the ex-
propriation giving rise to the counterclaim. Because Bancec was 
not the alter ego of the Cuban government as to that expropria-
tion, it was not the proper defendant to answer the claim. 
Although the Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion it 
clearly acknowledges the relevance of an inquiry into the precise 
role played by the instrumentality and the relationship of the in-
strumentality to the parent government. Bancec thus suggests a 
96. Chase Manhattan, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed supra notes 21-64; Banco 
Para el Comercio v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed supra notes 
65-79. 
97. 406 U.S. 759 (1972), discussed supra notes 28-33. 
98. Id. at 781. 
99. Id. at 912. 
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further obstacle, beyond that posed by the act of state doctrine, 
for American defendants asserting counterclaims against agencies 
or instrumentalities of a foreign state. While Bancec erects the 
obstacle, Chemical Bank offers one route around, if not over, that 
obstacle. Had the Second Circuit limited its analysis in Chemical 
Bank, as it did in Bancec, to an analysis of the counterclaims alone, 
those claims would have been dismissed because Banco Nacional 
did not play a principal role in the expropriation of Cuban Electric. 
It was not, therefore, the alter ego of the Cuban government as to 
that act, and as a result, was not the proper defendant against 
which to assert the counterclaims. The court did not limit its 
analysis to the plaintiff agency's role in the act underlying the 
counterclaim, however. Instead it analyzed the relationship of the 
instrumentality and the foreign state with regard to the acts out 
of which the plaintiff's claims arose. As to those direct claims that 
resulted from acts of the government in which the instrumentality 
played a key role (here the nationalization of the Cuban private 
banks) the plaintiff instrumentality is the alter ego of the foreign 
government. Since the instrumentality thus appears "as" the 
foreign state itself, counterclaims that would be appropriate if 
brought against the foreign state as plaintiff, may be brought 
against its alter ego appearing as plaintiff. 
D. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON (/NTERNATIONAL) 
V. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA 
First National Bank of Boston (/nternational) v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba (Boston) 100 differs essentially from those act of state 
cases previously discussed in that Banco Nacional de Cuba was the 
defendant in the action rather than the plaintiff. Plaintiff, First Na-
tional Bank of Boston (International) ("BBI") brought suit, as the 
assignee of the First National Bank of Boston ("Boston"), against 
Banco N acional to recover on letters of credit paid by Boston for 
which it had not been reimbursed. The letters of credit had been 
issued by Boston's Cuban branches ("Branches") before they were 
expropriated and nationalized by the Cuban government.101 BBI of-
fered two theories of recovery. First, it argued that the Branches 
100. 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 936 (1982). 
101. Id. at 896. Boston is a national banking association created under the laws of the 
United States. It established its first Cuban branch in 1923. By 1960 it had six branches in 
Cuba. Prior to their expropriation these branches regularly issued letters of credit to Cuban 
importers desiring to purchase foreign goods. The usual practice was for the importer to 
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were liable to Boston for the letters of credit and that Banco Na-
cional had assumed all liabilities of the Branches when they were na-
tionalized. Second, BBi contended that the prior course of dealings 
with, and representation of, Banco Nacional had created an "implied 
in fact" contract which Banco had breached.102 The trial court re-
jected both theories but ruled in favor of BBi on an unjust enrich-
ment theory.103 Banco Nacional denied that it had assumed the 
Branches' obligations and generally denied all liability. In addition, 
it asserted counterclaims against BBi for deposits which Boston 
had retained to offset its expropriation losses. Finally, Banco Na-
cional asserted that adjudication of BBI's claim was barred by the 
act of state doctrine. The trial court denied the counterclaim and 
found the act of state doctrine not a bar to BBI's claim.10' 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
recovery for unjust enrichment in this case was barred by the act 
of state doctrine. Neither authority nor sound reason supported 
the proposition that the act of state doctrine does not apply to a 
quasi-contract claim based on unjust enrichment.105 The court 
noted that if there were such an exception, "we would expect the 
exception to swallow the rule, for virtually every taking will 
enrich the sovereign, and to the extent that compensation is not 
paid that enrichment will have been unjust."106 
The court thus dismissed both BBI's claim, and Banco Na-
cional's counterclaims. In so doing, the court cited the rule that 
when a defendant asserts a counterclaim against an assignee based 
on a right of action against the assignor, any recovery on such 
deposit pesos with a branch, whereafter the branch would issue the letter of credit and send 
it to Boston, which would confirm the credit and send the letter of credit, along with the 
confirmation, to the seller. After shipment the seller would present the confirmed letter of 
credit to Boston and receive payment in United States dollars. Boston then would charge 
the amount paid against its branch's account. Id. at 897-98. 
There were 324 such letters of credit sued upon in this litigation. Some had been paid 
by Boston before the expropriation of the branches, most were paid immediately after it. As 
to those paid after the expropriation, Boston sought, but did not receive, assurance from 




105. Id. at 901 (quoting Mendendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973)) rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 
(1976). 
106. 658 F.2d at 901 (citations omitted). 
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counterclaim is limited to the amount of the assignee's recovery.101 
E. EMPRESA CUBANA EXPORTADORA DE AZUCAR y Sus 
DERIVADOS V. LAMBORN & CO. 
Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. 
Lamborn & Co.,108 decided two months before the six cases pre-
viously discussed, while significant in its own right, is particularly 
interesting when examined in conjunction with the other act of 
state doctrine cases. Lamborn & Co. is a corporation engaged in 
sugar brokerage services. In 1960, Lamborn contracted to buy, on 
behalf of Craig & Co., a quantity of sugar from Empresa Cubana 
Exportadora de Azucar. y Sus Derivados (Cubazucar), an entity 
wholly-owned by the Cuban government. Lamborn paid 95 percent 
of the purchase price but the balance of $32,088 remained due and 
owing to Cubazucar. In December 1960, the Cuban government ef-
fectively nationalized the offices of Craig & Co. in Havana.109 Al-
though Cuban law provided for an accounting to owners of seized 
assets, no such accounting was made to Craig. Craig then assigned 
to Lamborn all claims it might have against the Cuban govern-
ment arising from the taking of its offices.110 
The Republic of Cuba brought suit against Lamborn to re-
cover the debt owed on the sugar contract. Cuba was allowed to 
amend her complaint to substitute Cubazucar as plaintiff. 111 Lam-
born asserted a counterclaim against Cubazucar and a third party 
claim against the original plaintiff, the Republic of Cuba. Both of 
these claims sought to recover an amount equal to the value of 
Craig's seized assets. The district court awarded Cubazucar the 
amount owing on the sugar contract and dismissed the counter-
claim and third party claims.112 The court dismissed the counter-
claim because to hold otherwise would, in the court's opinion, 
simply encourage defendants to buy up claims against a foreign 
107. Id. at 902. 
108. 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981). 
109. The Cuban government, pursuant to Resolution No. 25187, designated an "inter-
venor" to take over the management of Craig's Havana offices for one year. The announced 
reason for the intervention was the problem of potential displacement of workers if the firm 
completely discontinued operations. All the assets of Craig's offices were seized. 652 F.2d at 
234. 
110. Id. 
111. Republic of Cuba v. Lamborn & Co., No. 61Civ.1847-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. l, 1979). 
112. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., No. 
61 Civ. 1847-CLB (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1980). 
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government plaintiff. The court dismissed the third party com-
plaint on the ground that it was barred by the act of state doctrine. 
The Second Circuit affirmed on somewhat different grounds. 113 
First, the court did not agree that Lamborn was barred from 
bringing the counterclaim and third party claim because those claims 
had been assigned to it.114 The court held, however, that Lamborn was 
not entitled to assert the counterclaim or the third party claim 
because the act of state doctrine barred judicial consideration of 
the claims. "The seizure of Craig's Havana office and accounts was 
a classic act of state. It was carried out pursuant to a formal 
resolution issued by the Minister of Labor, who was acting on 
behalf of the undisputedly sovereign Cuban government."115 The 
court, therefore, found no grounds for refusing to apply the doc-
trine. First, there are no agreements to which Cuba and the 
United States are party that define the circumstances under 
which intervention without compensation is allowed. Second, the 
Hickenlooper Amendment116 was found inapplicable because it has 
been interpreted in the Second Circuit to apply only in cases 
where the expropriated property reaches the United States.117 
Third, the executive branch had not expressed an opinion regard-
ing the appropriateness of the doctrine's applicability in the case, 
and therefore, the court found no reason to believe the application 
would be inconsistent with United States policy toward Cuba.118 
Fourth, the commercial exception 119 to the act of state doctrine 
was not available because "there is no indication here that the 
113. 652 F.2d at 233. 
114. Id. at 236. The court distinguished earlier cases that had suggested the rationale 
used by the trial court. In the instant case the claims assigned by Craig were related to the 
claim brought by Cubazucar. Additionally, Craig and Lamborn were closely affiliated in the 
same sugar business and were linked by a formal agency relationship in the transaction 
underlying the litigation here. Thus, any fears of creating a "brisk trade in claims against 
foreign states" were not relevant. Id. at 235-36. Cf., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase 
Manhattan, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), ajj'd, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). 
115. 652 F.2d at 237. 
116. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1979). The Hickenlooper Amendment was passed by the 
United States Congress in response to Sabbatino. It, in essence, bars the use of the act of 
state doctrine in cases where confiscation has been carried out in violation of international 
law, unless the executive branch expressly requests that the doctrine apply. 652 F.2d at 237. 
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 402 (2d Cir. 
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
118. 652 F.2d at 237-38. 
119. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Ltd. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690-95 
(1976). 
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seizure of Craig's Havana assets was anything but the governmen-
tal action of a sovereign which it purported to be."120 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Second Circuit's 
opinion is its discussion of the difference between the act of state 
doctrine, and sovereign immunity, with regard to the assertion of 
a counterclaim against a foreign state. The court explained: 
[Sovereign] immunity relates to the prerogative right not to 
have sovereign property subject to suit; fairness has been 
thought to require that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be 
subject to legitimate counterclaims against it. The act of state 
doctrine, however, although it shares with the immunity doc-
trine a respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for de-
termining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.121 
The act of state doctrine mandates the rule to be applied as a mat-
ter of domestic substantive law. A foreign state plaintiff may in-
voke the doctrine as it may invoke any other rule of the forum. 122 
"Depriving a sovereign plaintiff of its acts of state defense to 
counterclaims would be just as arbitrary and unfair as stripping it 
of its right to invoke any other affirmative defense, such as the 
statute of limitations or res judicata."123 
The court recognized that the application of the act of state 
doctrine in certain cases obtained an inequitable result. N onethe-
less, abandoning the doctrine each time the foreign state appears 
as a plaintiff would "inevitably force us to examine the validity of 
each property seizure made abroad by a foreign sovereign, which 
is something the Supreme Court has forbidden us to do."124 
Lamborn 's approach to the issue of the applicability of the act 
of state doctrine is essentially different from the approach taken 
in Chase Manhattan and the act of state cases decided with it. In 
Lamborn, the Second Circuit applied a Sabbatino analysis, focus-
ing, at least in part, on the absence of an internationally agreed 
upon standard by which to judge the legality of Cuba's act of ex-
propriation. Chase Manhattan's tripartite test, however, focusing 
as it does on the procedural posture of the claim and foreign policy 
120. 652 F.2d at 238. 
121. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964)). 
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concerns, avoids consideration of the availability of an interna-
tionally accepted standard. In Chase Manhattan the court stated 
that its decision in Lamborn did not contradict the tripartite for-
mulation: 
In Lamborn, we held that the act of state doctrine was applicable 
to bar recovery, by way of either complaint or counterclaim, for 
assets seized by the Cuban government. The party seeking to 
recover from the Cuban government in Lamborn had no [State 
Department] letter, and the Executive Branch had expressed no 
view as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine in that 
case.125 
The problem of reconciling Lamborn and Chase Manhattan, how-
ever, lies not with the result in the two cases, but rather with the 
rationale used in each to reach the result. A strict tripartite test 
analysis in Lamborn would have compelled the same result as was 
reached by the court in that case. Instead of applying such a test, 
the court chose to approach the act of state question with Sab-
batino 's cautions regarding the role of the judiciary in expropria-
tion cases clearly in mind. Thus, although Chase Manhattan was 
decided after Lamborn, those arguing the act of state doctrine be-
fore the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would do well to advo-
cate the desired result by reference to both Chase Manhattan's 
"phenomenological rule" and the more traditional concerns re-
flected by Sabbatino. 
IL EXTRADITION: DEFINING THE ROLE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIARY 
A. IN RE MACKIN 
In In re Mackin, 126 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was 
presented with complicated questions regarding not only the 
respective roles of the executive and judicial branches in extradi-
tion proceedings, but also the power of an appellate court to 
review a magistrate's decision denying extradition. Desmond 
Mackin, a native of Northern Ireland, was arrested in New York 
City on October 6, 1980, pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant 
issued under the terms of a Treaty of Extradition to which the 
125. 658 F.2d at 884 n.12. 
126. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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United States and the United Kingdom are party.121 On November 
19, 1980, the British Government filed a formal complaint128 re-
questing Mackin's extradition and a warrant of arrest was issued 
the same day by a district judge of the Southern District of New 
York.129 
Magistrate Naomi Reice Buchwald presided over the extradi-
tion hearing. She concluded that the United Kingdom had satisfied 
its burden of producing sufficient evidence to support extradition 
on two of the three charges. She refused to certify130 Mackin to the 
127. Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty]. Article VIII of the 
Treaty provides for the issuance of provisional arrest warrants: 
(1) In urgent cases the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the re-
quested Party, be provisionally arrested on application through the diplo-
matic channel by the competent authorities of the requesting Party. The ap-
plication shall contain an indication of intention to request the extradition of 
the person sought and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a 
conviction against that person, and if available, a description of the person 
sought, and such further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify 
the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been committed, or the person 
sought been convicted, in the territory of the requested Party. 
128. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. l, 54, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), habeas 
corpus denied, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The United Kingdom sought Mackin on charges 
arising from a shooting incident in Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland, between 
Mackin, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Stephen Wooten, a British 
soldier. Mackin was indicted on charges of attempted murder, wounding with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm, and possession of firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger 
life. After his release on bail, Mackin failed to appear for trial, entered the United States il-
legally and was apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 124. 
129. Extradition proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). The proceedings 
are initiated when the requesting state files a verified complaint with the court having 
jurisdiction over the accused. The complaint must charge the fugitive with the commission 
of an extraditable offense set forth in the relevant extradition treaty. A federal magistrate 
issues the arrest warrant and, in the presence of the accused, determines whether the re-
questing state has offered sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the 
accused has committed the extraditable offense. If the federal magistrate determines that 
the evidence supports such probable cause, he orders the accused incarcerated and certifies 
the record of the hearing to the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). 
The scope of judicial review of this determination was one of the issues before the 
Second Circuit in In re Mackin. See infra text accompanying notes 136-142. 
The Secretary of State must independently determine whether to extradite the ac-
cused to the requesting Party. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976). The Secretary may deny extradition 
on humanitarian grounds. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), habeas cor-
pus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 167 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
130. See supra note 129. 
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Secretary of State on the ground that the offenses for which 
Mackin was charged fell within Article V(l)(c)(i) of the U.S.-U.K. 
Extradition Treaty.131 That Article provides in relevant part: 
(1) Extradition will not be granted if: 
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded 
by the requested Party as one of a political character .... 
The United States132 appealed from the Magistrate's decision 
denying extradition and, in the alternative, sought mandamus to 
require her to grant the request.133 The United States not only 
challenged the Magistrate's determination that Mackin's alleged 
crime was a political offense, but also challenged the power of the 
judiciary to make such a determination, arguing that a determina-
tion under Article V(l)(c)(i) of the Treaty lies exclusively with the 
executive branch.134 Mackin argued that the Magistrate's order 
was not appealable, that the circuit court lacked power to issue a 
writ of mandamus and that the determination of a political offense 
under Article V(l)(c)(i) is a question for the judicial branch, correct-
ly resolved by the Magistrate.135 
The Second Circuit turned first to the issue of appealability of 
orders granting or denying extradition requests. Judge Friendly, 
writing for the court, pursued an historical analysis of the issue. 
The doctrine of non-appealability of extradition decisions was first 
established in In re Metzger. 136 Review of a district judge's de-
termination on extradition was sought in the United States Su-
preme Court. In rejecting the review, the Supreme Court stated 
that the executive had acted "very properly"137 in seeking a hearing 
before a judicial officer. However, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the case "was heard and decided by the district judge at his 
chambers, and not in the court .... "138 In that role the district 
131. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127. 
132. The requesting Party is represented by the requested Party in extradition hear-
ings. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. XIV(l). 
133. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 122, 125. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847). This case involved extradition under a treaty with 
France which made no provision for the appearance of the accused before a judge or 
magistrate. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, United States-France, 
8 Stat. 580 T.S. No. 103. President Polk and his Secretary of State nonetheless determined 
to submit the French government's extradition request to a district judge for a hearing. See 
In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9511). 
137. In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 189. 
138. Id. at 191. 
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judge was exercising "a special authority, and the law has made 
no provision for revision of his judgment."138a Judge Friendly 
found nothin in the case law since In re Metzger to indicate any re-
treat from the doctrine of non-appealability .139 Further support for 
this doctrine lay in the opinions of two United States Attorneys 
General.140 The opinion of Attorney General Coffey in 1983 was un-
equivocal: 
In cases of this kind, the judge or magistrate acts under special 
authority conferred by treaties and acts of Congress; and though 
his action be in form and effect judicial, it is yet not an exercise 
of any part of what is technically considered the judicial power of 
the United States. No appeal from his decision is given by the law 
under which he acts, and therefore no right of appeal exists.141 
Finally, the court turned to recent State and Justice Department 
views on the subject.142 These views were issued in response to a 
bill introduced in the Senate in 1981 which would, inter alia, pro-
vide for appeal of extradition findings to the appropriate court of 
appeals.143 
According to Judge Friendly, the "only conceivable basis for ap-
pellate jurisdiction"144 over extradition orders was 28 U .S.C. § 1291 
"which authorizes appeals to the court of appeals from 'final deci-
sions of the district courts of the United States."'145 Recognizing 
that 28 U .S.C. § 3184, the statute governing extradition pro-
ceedings, authorizes such proceedings by any judge or justice of 
the United States, or any magistrate authorized to conduct such 
proceedings, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdic-
tion of any state, Judge Friendly concluded that extradition pro-
ceedings could not be decisions of district courts. 146 
138a. Id. 
139. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 126; In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852); Collins v. 
Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920); Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes, 
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
140. 668 F.2d at 127. The Court cited an 1853 opinion of Attorney General Cushing, 6 
Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 96 (1853) and 1863 opinion of Attorney General Coffey, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 
501, 506 (1863). 
141. 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 501, 506. 
142. 668 F.2d at 128-29. 
143. 127 CONG. REC. S9952 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). The relevant portions of the testi-
mony before the Senate Judiciary Committee by representatives of the two Departments 
are quoted in the Second Circuit opinion. 668 F.2d at 129. 
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The Second Circuit held that no appeal lay from the Magis-
trate's decision.147 The preclusion of a right of appeal in this case, 
and in numerous other extradition cases, 148 however, does not 
leave the parties without other means of relief. A person deter-
mined extraditable under section 3184 may seek a writ of habeas 
corpus, the denial or grant of which is appealable.149 The re-
questing State, nonetheless, is entitled to refile the extradition re-
quest.150 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the question of whether 
the court had power to hear the Government's petition for a writ 
of mandamus.151 The court articulated the standard applied to 
determine when courts have power to hear such petitions, where, 
as here, appellate jurisdiction is lacking. "[M]andamus is reserved 
for 'exceptional cases' ... and ... the touchstones are usurpation 
of power, clear abuse of discretion and the presence of an issue of 
first impression."152 The only issue in Mackin which met this stan-
dard was whether the Magistrate had exceeded her jurisdiction 
by deciding whether the offenses for which Mackin's extradition 
was sought came within the political exception provision of the 
Treaty, rather than leaving that determination to the executive 
branch. The Second Circuit thus turned to the most controversial 
issue in the case. 
The court began its analysis by focusing on the language of the 
Treaty and the specific language of Article V(l)(c)(i) which speaks 
of offenses that are "regarded by the requested Party as ... of a 
political character."153 Unfortunately, the Treaty does not define 
what is meant by "requested Party." The Government argued 
that "requested Party" refers to the executive branch.154 The 
Magistrate and the Second Circuit interpreted the language to re-
fer to the government in general.155 
147. Id. at 130. 
148. See id. at 127. 
149. Id. at 128; 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976). 
150. 668 F .2d at 128. 
151. Id. at 130. 
152. Id. at 131 (citations omitted). 
153. Id. at 132. 
154. Brief of the United States of America at 28, In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
155. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. l, p. 54, slip op. at 39-40; 668 F.2d at 133. The 
Second Circuit cited numerous other articles in the Extradition Treaty, as well as other 
extradition treaties, to buttress its interpretation of the "requested Party" language in Ar-
ticle V(l)(c)(i). For a thorough discussion of the language used in articles on the political of-
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The Government argued that support for its interpretation of 
the language could be found in judicial decisions interpreting the 
exception covered by Article V(l)(c)(ii) of the Extradition Treaty. 
The latter article provides an exception to extradition when "[t]he 
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in 
fact been made with a view to try or punish him for art offense of a 
political character ."155a It is well-settled that the applicability of 
this article is a determination which lies solely in the discretion of 
the executive branch.156 The court rejected this argument by 
adopting the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
when faced with the identical argument.157 The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that a different approach to the two parts of the political 
offense exception was not contradictory .158 The determination of 
whether a person had been charged with a political offense (an 
Article V(l)(c)(i) inquiry) required the court to evaluate past facts 
with regard to violent political activity at the time the act in ques-
tion took place and determine the person's connection with that 
violence and activity .159 The determination of the requesting Par-
ty's purpose for seeking extradition (an Article V(l)(c)(ii) inquiry) 
requires an evaluation of the motives of foreign governments, 
which touches on the foreign relations and foreign policy of the 
United States, and therefore, is better left to the executive 
branch.160 
Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that it was not "writing 
on a clean slate" in this matter, citing the "long standing recogni-
tion that courts shall determine whether an offense comes within 
the political offense exception."161 The court cited numerous cases 
fense exception in recent extradition treaties, see Note, In re Mackin: Is the Application of 
the Political Offense Exception an Extradition Issue for the Judicial or Executive Branch?, 
5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565, 582-3 (1982). 
155a. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, at V(l)(c)(ii). 
156. In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916); 
Garcia-Gullern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
989 (1972); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932); In re Locatelli, 468 F. 
Supp. 568, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), habeas 
corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619 
F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980). 
157. 668 F.2d at 133; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 
(1981). Eain is discussed infra at note 164. 
158. 641 F.2d at 516. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. 662 F.2d at 134. 
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discussing the role of the judiciary in extradition proceedings in 
general, but not directly involving the political offense exception. 
One of the problems for the parties in Mackin was the paucity of 
judicial decisions on point. The precise question of whether a court 
has jurisdiction to apply the political offense exception has arisen 
twice in United States courts. In both cases, one decided in 1894,162 
the other in 1981, 163 the court exercised jurisdiction to determine 
whether a political offense had been committed.164 Eain v. Wilkes 
and In re Ezeta, as well as Mackin, closely examined the language 
of the statute establishing United States extradition procedures, 
now codified as 18 U .S.C. § 3184, 165 to determine whether the 
statute assigned the determination of a political offense exception 
exclusively to the executive branch. In Mackin, the Government 
argued that section 3184 limited the court's jurisdiction to a deter-
mination of whether there was probable cause to believe an ex-
traditable offense had been committed. 
The language of the extradition statute provides that a magis-
trate has authority to conduct an extradition proceeding to hear 
and consider "evidence of criminality" to determine if such evi-
dence is sufficient "to sustain the charge under the provisions of 
the proper treaty ."166 Focusing on this language, the Eain court 
held that a magistrate has jurisdiction to apply the political of-
162. In re Ezeta, 62 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). 
163. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
164. Eain involved the extradition to Israel of a suspected Palestinean Liberation 
Organization (PLO) member accused of committing a terrorist bombing which resulted in 
the death and injury of Israeli citizens. 641 F.2d at 507. A federal magistrate found probable 
cause to believe that Eain had committed the crime, held that the political offense exception 
had not been proven, and certified Eain's extradition to the Secretary of State. Id. at 507, 
520. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Eain's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Abu Eain, No. 79 M. 175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1979). 
The Seventh Circuit held on appeal that Eain had failed to prove his offense was a political 
one. 641 F.2d at 520. 
Ezeta was the first judicial opinion in the United States which considered the political 
offense exception. See Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Excep-
tion to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 391 (1980). The Salvadoran government 
sought the extradition of General Ezeta, a former president of Salvador, on charges of mur-
der and robbery, crimes allegedly committed during a revolution in which Ezeta sought to 
maintain his existing government in power. 62 F. Supp. at 975. The Salvadoran government 
argued in Ezeta that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether Ezeta's was a 
political offense. Id. at 995. The court disagreed, holding that the delegation of authority to 
the President to make a determination regarding the political nature of the offense did not 
deprive the magistrate of such authority. Id. at 996-7. 
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976); See supra note 129. 
166. Id. 
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fense exception because the exception itself is a provision of the 
extradition treaty.167 Ezeta suggested that the phrase "evidence of 
criminality" does not compel a conclusion that the magistrate's 
decision is limited to determining probable cause.168 Similarly, the 
Second Circuit in Mackin concluded that the Magistrate had juris-
diction to determine the political offense question.169 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with issues in 
Mackin which were difficult of determination and politically signif-
icant in their resolution. The conclusion that a magistrate has juris-
diction to determine the applicability of the political offense excep-
tion in the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, and the determination that 
the magistrate's certification decision is not appealable gives con-
siderable power to a single individual, power that may be exercised 
to an end that potentially affects United States foreign relations. 
The court's conclusion on the appealability issue is well supported 
by history and judicial precedent. The court can fairly be criti-
cized, however, for its reasoning, if not its resolution, of the polit-
ical offense exception issue. The court recognized the paucity of 
judicial precedents directly on point, yet seemed to bind itself un-
necessarily to those precedents. The choice between assignment 
of exclusive power to apply the exception to the executive branch, 
and a finding of concurrent jurisdiction in the judicial branch, im-
plies important policy considerations regarding the respective 
roles of the two branches in issues of a political nature, particular-
ly issues implicating foreign policy. Despite this fact, the court 
gave scant attention to such policy concerns. 
167. 641 F.2d at 513. The magistrate in Mackin made reference to this interpretation of 
the statute but refused to pass on the merits of such an interpretation. In re Mackin, No. 80, 
Cr. Misc. 1, 54, Slip Op. at 38, n* (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981). 
168. 62 F. Supp. at 995-96. 
169. It follows that, as the law now stands, both the judicial and the executive 
branches have recognized that, under§ 3184, decision whether a case falls within 
the political offense, exception is for the judicial officer. The Government cites us 
to no overriding principle which dictates a contrary result .... While the policy 
arguments made by the Government are not without force, particularly in an age 
of spreading terrrorism, they are not so overwhelming as to justify us in con-
cluding that the 1848 statute and its successors did not mean that the judicial of-
ficer should decide whether the offense for which extradition is sought is political. 
Whether the national interests would be better served by the position here ad-
vocated by the executive branch, which it has asked Congress to adopt in S. 1639, 
is for that body to determine. We therefore conclude that the Magistrate correctly 
sustained her own power to decide the political offense question and thus, for 
reasons heretofore explained, there is no basis for our issuing mandamus. 
668 F .2d at 137. 
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The court's resolution of the political offense exception issue, 
and the failure to explicitly address policy considerations raised 
by that issue, may have been motivated, at least in part, by cogni-
zance of the proposed Senate bill granting to the executive branch 
exclusive jurisdiction over political offense determinations.110 Read 
with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Eain, Mackin indicates to 
Congress that federal courts are inclined to read section 3184 in a 
non-restrictive fashion. Thus it is clearly up to Congress to act if it 
believes the determination that an offense falls within the political 
offense exception, barring an otherwise appropriate extradition, 
more properly lies with the executive branch than with the judi-
cial branch. 
B. HU YAU-LEUNG V. SOSCIA 
In Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 111 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was presented with another question regarding the United 
States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty.112 Hu Yau-Leung in-
volved the interpretation of the double criminality article173 in the 
Extradition Treaty. This article provides that a person is extra-
ditable if the facts presented at the extradition hearing174 disclose 
an offense listed in the Extradition Treaty's schedule of offenses 
and: 
(a) the offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by 
imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one 
year or by the death penalty; 
(b) the offense is extraditable under the relevant law, being the 
law of the United Kingdom or other territory to which this 
Treaty applies ... ; and 
(c) the offense constitutes a felony under the law of the United 
States of America. ma 
Hong Kong authorities sought the extradition of Hu Yau-
170. CONG. REC. S9952 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). See supra note 143. 
171. 649 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981). 
172. Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, supra note 
127 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty]. Questions regarding the political of-
fense exception of this Treaty, Article V(l)(c)(i), were raised in In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 
(2d Cir. 1981), supra notes 126-170. 
173. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. III (1). 
174. Extradition proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). See supra note 
129. 
174a. 649 F.2d at 916; U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127. 
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Leung to stand trial on robbery charges.175 Hu was sixteen years 
old when he allegedly committed the crime. After Hu's arrest in 
New York, a United States magistrate conducted a hearing and 
determined that Hu was extraditable.176 Hu sought a writ of 
habeas corpus177 alleging that, because the Extradition Treaty re-
quired that the offense charged constitute a felony under the law 
of the United States, 178 he was being held in violation of the Trea-
ty. He argued that his age at the time of the alleged crime 
qualified him for treatment as a juvenile under the Federal 
Juvenile Delinquency Act (F JDA).179 Pursuant to the F JDA, a 
determination of guilt results in an adjudication of status, rather 
than a conviction.180 Since the FJDA represented a law of the 
United States with regard to a particular class of offenders, Hu 
argued that his act was not felonious and, therefore, that he was 
not extraditable.181 
The district court agreed with Hu that the F JDA was ap-
plicable in this case, and conducted a hearing to determine if Hu 
would be proceeded against as a juvenile if he committed the acts 
in the United States.182 The district court concluded that he would 
indeed be proceeded against as a juvenile and granted the peti-
tion.182a 
The district court held that the phrase "the law of the United 
States" referred to federal, not state, law .183 To determine 
whether an offense for which extradition was sought constitutes a 
felony under United States law, the FJDA, in the court's opinion, 
had to be considered. Under the F JDA, at least two procedures 
are possible: 
175. 649 F .2d at 915. Article Il(l)(a) of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, provides that 
by Agreement of the Parties, the treaty obligations shall extend to territories for which the 
United Kingdom has responsibility in international relations. The parties agreed to name 
Hong Kong a party in 1976. 
176. 649 F.2d at 916. 
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976). 
178. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 127, art. III(l)(c). 
179. 18 u.s.c. § 5032 (1976). 
180. See United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1074 
(4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub 
nom., Benigno v. United States, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976). 
181. 649 F.2d at 916. 
182. Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 500 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 649 F.2d 
914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981). 
182a. Id. at 1390. 
183. Id. at 1385. 
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[w]here federal offenses are committed by persons under sixteen, 
juveniles are turned over to state juvenile programs unless the 
relevant state lacks or refuses to include the juvenile in an ap-
propriate program. In that case, the district courts retain juris-
diction over the juvenile. Under the Act, according to the 
district court, a juvenile is not "convicted" of a crime but "adju-
dicated a juvenile deliquent." 184 
It also is possible under the F JDA for the Attorney General to 
order that a juvenile, aged sixteen to eighteen, who commits 
crimes that would be felonious if committed by an adult, be sub-
ject to the same penalties as an adult. 185 In order to effect this 
transfer to the conventional criminal justice system, a district 
court judge must determine whether the "interests of justice" are 
served.186 The district court, assuming that such a proceeding 
might have been initiated against Hu had he committed the acts 
for which he was accused in the United States, conducted a hear-
ing.186a It was after this hearing that the district court determined 
that Hu would have been proceeded against as a juvenile delin-
quent under the F JDA and, therefore, was not extraditable.186b 
The district court acknowledged that the Treaty made no 
specific reference to the treatment of juveniles, but found in the 
Treaty evidence of an intent on the part of the United States and 
United Kingdom to consult their own domestic policy .187 Of partic-
ular significance to the court was the content of Article 111(1) it-
self. The court noted that a felony is defined by United States law 
as "any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year ,"188 and concluded that subsection (a) of Article 
111(1) (length of punishment available for conviction of crime) and 
subsection (c) (offense constitutes a felony under laws of U.S.) 
would be redundant if subsection (c) were read narrowly to encom-
pass only the nature of the offense and not other policy concerns.189 
The Court of Appeals reversed in a divided opinion. The maj-
ority concluded that subsection (c) of Article 111(1) of the Extradi-
184. 649 F.2d at 916. 
185. 18 u.s.c. § 5032 (1976). 
186. 18 u .s.c. § 5032. 
186a. 649 F.2d at 916. 
186b. 500 F.Supp. at 1390. 
187. Id. at 1386. 
188. 18 u .s.c. § 1(1) (1976). 
189. 500 F. Supp. at 1384. 
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tion Treaty was not a bar to extradition. The double criminality 
test, reflected in Article 111(1), simply sought to determine "if the 
individual had committed the same acts in the United States, 
would a crime have been committed and would it have been a 
felony?"190 The majority found inappropriate the consideration of 
collateral issues in an extradition hearing: 
[W]e do not believe that the framers of the British Extradition 
Treaty intended that minitrials would be held to determine 
whether individuals might in some way receive more lenient 
treatment under the criminal law. The Treaty, like most other 
treaties, explicitly limits the type of hearing in the requested 
country to determine extraditability. Such hearings have been 
held to have limited scope, both as to the type of defenses which 
may be raised and the type of evidence which may be received. 
It would be contrary to this policy against protracted extradita-
bility hearings to allow extradition courts to consider how other 
courts might exercise their discretion in determining whether an 
individual such as Hu should be treated as within a juvenile jus-
tice system. 191 
At least as significant as the court's discussion of the scope of 
the double criminality requirement, was the court's discussion of 
the appropriate focus for determining whether the offense is a 
felony under the laws of the United States. Here again, the Second 
Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that under 
subsection (c) only federal law was relevant.192 The Court of Ap-
peals held that "[t]he phrase 'under the law of the United States of 
America' in an extradition treaty referring to American criminal 
law must be taken as including both state and federal law absent 
evidence that it was intended to the contrary ."193 According to the 
court, the most reasonable interpretation of the language of sub-
section (c) is that "for conduct that would have violated any fed-
eral statute, federal law determines whether the conduct would 
have been a felony, and for conduct that would have violated only 
a state statute, state law governs the felony determination."194 In 
190. 649 F.2d at 918. 
191. Id. at 919-20. The court found further support for this conclusion by reference to 
other extradition treaties of the United States. Many of these treaties contain special provi-
sions relevant to juveniles. Id. at 920. 
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this case, the law of the State of New York, the state in which Hu 
was found,195 governed.196 Under New York law, Hu would be con-
sidered an "eligible youth" under New York's youthful offender 
system,197 and thus could have been relieved "from the onus of a 
criminal record"198 under circumstances similar to those recog-
nized by the F JDA. The court held, however, that under the terms 
of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, the availability of alternate 
proceedings against eligible youths was not an appropriate con-
sideration in an extradition hearing.199 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tenney disagreed with the 
majority on both the source, and the scope, of the double criminali-
ty inquiry under the Treaty. First, in Judge Tenney's view, fed-
eral law, rather than state law, was the appropriate source.200 
Focusing on federal law assured that a uniform standard would 
determine the gravity of the offense and would promote national 
policies.201 Second, Judge Tenney disagreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the scope of inquiry under Article III(l) was 
limited to the nature of the offense, stating: 
It is true that extradition turns on the status of the crime, not 
the status of the criminal. Yet it is not Hu's youth qua youth that 
prohibits extradition, but the "non-criminal" result effected by 
the Act that is necessarily invoked by virtue of Hu's age.202 
IV. LIMITS ON LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW 
CONVENTION: FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION V. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES 
In one of the most interesting and politically significant Survey 
cases, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the 
question of what unit of account was to be employed in converting 
195. Id. Where state law applies, it is the law of the state where the offender is found 
that will be consulted under the terms of extradition proceedings. The only exception to 
this rule exists where that state's law is contrary to the weight of law in other American 
jurisdictions. Id n.4. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). This exception, to 
some extent, diminishes the possibility of an extradition decision turning on the fortuity of 
an offender being found in a state whose law is aberrational. 
196. 649 F.2d at 918. 
197. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 720.10.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982). 
198. 649 F.2d at 919. 
199. See id. 
200. 649 F .2d at 922 (Tenney, J ., dissenting). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 921. 
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judgments under the Warsaw Convention into United States 
dollars. In this case, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans WorldAirlines,203 
the court declared the Convention's limits on liability prospectively 
unenforceable.204 The court's opinion and subsequent United States 
action205 leaves the exact status of the Warsaw Convention in United 
States courts in serious doubt. 
The Warsaw Convention,2°6 drafted in the late 1920's, is one of 
many international transport liability conventions which limit car-
riers' liability for claims arising out of personal, or property, dam-
ages or loss.207 The Convention sets out the circumstances under 
which the carrier shall be liable for personal injuries, damage or 
loss of baggage, and damage due to delay.208 The Convention also 
establishes a limit on the extent of liability for personal injury and 
loss of luggage or other goods.209 In 1979, plaintiff, Franklin Mint, 
contracted with defendant, Trans Wnrld Airlines (TWA), to carry 
a shipment of numismatic material by air from the United States 
to England. The material was either lost or destroyed, rendering 
TWA liable under the Convention. In a -suit brought by Franklin 
Mint in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, TWA sought to limit its liability under Article 22 of 
the Convention. 210 The liability limits in Article 22 are stated in 
203. Franklin Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 
1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3084 (1983). 
204. Id. 
205. See infra text accompanying note 234. 
206. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 
137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. 
207. Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions 
and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645 (1974). 
208. Warsaw Convention, supra note 206, art. 17, 18, 19. 
209. Id., art. 22. 
210. 690 F.2d 303, 304-05. Article 22 of the Convention states in pertinent part: 
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the car-
rier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor 
has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a 
special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum 
if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not 
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the 
actual value to the consignor at delivery. 
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc con-
sisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred 
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terms of a specific number of French "Poincare" francs. A "Poin-
care" franc is a unit of account which consists of 65 1/2 milligrams 
of gold at a standard fineness of 900 thousandths.211 The dollar 
value of each specified limit is calculated by converting the gold 
value of the specified number of ~>Poincare" francs into United 
States dollars. On its face, this conversion appears relatively sim-
ple. The Second Circuit, however, articulated the complex prob-
lem facing courts asked to apply the Convention's liability limits: 
The difficulty arises from the fact that when Article 22 was 
drafted, gold served official monetary functions and its price was 
set by law. The Convention thus selected it as the unit of conver-
sion in order to ensure judgments of uniform value as well as a 
stable and easily calculable limitation on liability. The plain but 
highly troublesome fact is that by international agreement and 
United States domestic legislation gold has now lost its 
monetary functions and no longer has an official price. Unfor-
tunately for parties to international airline transactions as well 
as for us, the terms of Article 22 continue to utilize gold as the 
unit of conversion. Thus, the parties raise the issue of what unit 
of account is now to be used to convert judgments under the 
Convention into United States dollars.212 
The parties in Franklin Mint offered four alternatives in 
arguing the issue before the district and circuit courts: the last of-
ficial price of gold in the United States, the price of gold on the 
free market, the Special Drawing Right (SDR) (a unit of account 
established by the International Monetary Fund), and the ex-
change value of the French franc at the time of conversion.2128 The 
choice of the appropriate standard held considerable financial con-
sequences for the parties because the dollar value of the limitation 
ranged from $6,500 to $400,000 depending on the standard 
selected.213 Additionally, in the court's opinion, each alternative 
"appears to have a devastating argument against it,"214 despite the 
fact that "each has been adopted as the proper unit of account by 
at least one party, or domestic tribunal of a party, to the Conven-
tion."215 
211. Warsaw Convention, supra note 206, art. 22(4). 
212. 690 F.2d at 305. 
212a. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 306. 
215. Id. at 309. 
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The court began its analysis by recognizing the need for an 
established unit of conversion, stressing that "[w]ithout it, a ra-
tional limit on liability cannot exist, much less one which produces 
judgments of equal value in different currencies."216 It then turned 
to each of the prof erred alternatives individually. 
The conversion standard employed by the district court in 
determining the dollar value of TWA's liability under Article 22 of 
the Warsaw Convention was the last official price of gold in the 
United States.211 The district court reasoned that the last official 
price of gold, as a conversion standard, had been espoused by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board, thus coming "as close as anything to con-
stituting a governmental interpretation of the Article 22 limita-
tion."218 The court found further support for use of this standard in 
the fact that all domestic carriers, including TWA, employed it in 
calculating liability printed on their tariffs. The court concluded 
this was evidence of intent by the parties in the case to apply the 
last official price of gold. 219 
The Second Circuit, while adopting this standard to resolve 
the instant case, 220 refused to accept it as the governing standard 
for future cases.220a The court pointed to both international and 
domestic action indicating that use of the official price of gold as a 
conversion standard was "wholly out of touch with economic and 
monetary reality ."221 Thus, the court concluded, use of the re-
216. Id. 
217. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
218. Id. at 1289. 
219. Id. 
220. See infra text accompanying note 233. 
220a. 690 F .2d at 312. 
221. Id. at 309. The court addressed at some length the decline of the gold standard 
and the economic causes and effects of that decline. Id. at 306-09. Of particular importance 
to the issue presented in Franklin Mint was the reaction of the international community 
and the United States to the declining strength of the dollar, and the growing United States 
balance of payments deficit during the 1960's. These events led the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to propose the abolishment of the official price of gold and to substitute Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) as the Fund's unit of account. This plan, proposed in the 1976 
Jamaica Accords, was passed by IMF members and took effect on April l, 1978. In the in-
terim between proposal and passage of the plan in the IMF, the United States passed im-
plementing legislation abolishing the official price of gold. (The official price of gold at that 
time was $42.29 per ounce). See Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976), repealed 
by Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2661 (1976). 
This radical change in the international monetary system created an obvious 
problem under the Warsaw Convention. With gold abandoned as a currency base 
and the official price repealed, gold became a commodity with a daily fluctuating 
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pealed official price of gold "finds no support in law or logic." 222 
The court similarly found no logical support for the district court's 
reliance on the Civil Aeronautics Board's use of the official price of 
gold. The Board had refused to adopt Special Drawing Rights as a 
unit of conversion because of the absence of congressional ap-
proval for that unit, yet the Board had adopted the last official 
price of gold in the face of specific rejection of that unit by Con-
gress. 222a 
The Second Circuit rejected adoption of the free market price 
of gold as a unit of conversion, characterizing it as "the highly 
volatile price of a commodity determined in part by forces of sup-
ply and demand unrelated to currency values." 223 Adoption of the 
current exchange value of the French franc was similarly rejected 
by the court largely because it had initially been rejected by the 
parties to the Warsaw Convention. The parties wanted to avoid 
the use of a single national currency, the value of which could be 
changed by unilateral action. 224 
free market price. That the difficulty in continuing to use gold as a monetary base 
undermined the Convention's unit of conversion was immediately recognized. 
Thus, the Warsaw conferees met in Montreal in 1975, even before the Jamaica Ac-
cords, and drafted and signed a Protocol substituting SDR's as the Convention's 
unit of conversion. At the time of the proposal, the SDR was calculated in terms of 
gold. With the Jamaica Accords, the referent was changed to a basket of 16 na-
tional currencies, and in January, 1981, the basket was reduced to five currencies. 
The Montreal Protocol was presented to the United States Senate in January, 
1977 but has not been approved. 
690 F.2d at 308, (footnotes omitted). Since this opinion was published the United States 
Senate rejected the Montreal Protocol. See infra text accompanying note 234. 
222. 690 F.2d at 309. 
222a. Id. at 310. 
223. Id. at 306. One United States court adopted this conversion standard. In Boehr-
inger Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. 
Tex. 1982), the District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that Pan American's 
limitation of liability under the Warsaw Convention was properly calculated by reference to 
the current free market price of gold. Id. at 353. Plaintiff, Boehringer, sought to recover 
against Pan Am under Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention for damage to an automated 
blood analyzer that it had contracted with the airline to ship from Brazil to Houston, Texas. 
The district court rejected the defendant's contention that its liability should be deter-
mined by the last official price of gold. The court reasoned that allowing Pam Am to limit its 
liability under the Convention based on the repealed official price of gold "would perpetrate 
a legal fiction of the purest kind." Id. at 352. The court found no judicial decisions on point 
and concluded that absent such precedent it must rest its decision on "a close reading and 
interpretation of Article 22 of the Convention." Id. Examining the ordinary meaning of the 
words and the negotiating history of the Convention, the district court determined that the 
framers adopted gold because of "its tendency to reflect real values better than currency." 
Id. at 350. This purpose, the court concluded, would best be served by use of the free 
market price of gold. Id. at 353. 
224. Id. at 310. 
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Finally, the court turned to the question of adopting the In-
ternational Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as 
units of conversion.225 The relative stability of SDRs led some of 
the signatories of the Warsaw Convention to propose it as a 
substitute for the "Poincare" franc as the unit of account under 
the Convention. This proposal was incorporated into the 1975 
Montreal Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, which has been 
presented to the signatories to the Convention for ratification.226 
Despite the existence of the Protocol, the court found adoption of 
the SDR as a unit of conversion to be inappropriate for three 
reasons. First, the Convention gives no authority for use of the 
SDR and the Senate had not authorized such use by ratifying the 
Montreal Protocol. 227 Second, adoption of the SDR would only be a 
first step and "a further step must be taken to define the limita-
tion of liability in terms of a particular number of SDRs per 
kilogram of baggage."228 The court would be required to set this 
limitation. Finally, the SDR, being a creation of the IMF, is subject 
to modification or elimination by that body. The court found it had 
"no power under the terms of the Convention or relevant domestic 
source of authority to adopt a unit of conversion variable at the 
whim of an international body distinct from the parties to the Con-
vention."229 
The court characterized the issue presented not as requiring 
interpretation of a treaty, but as requiring substitution of a new 
treaty term: 
We deal here not with ambiguities which may be clarified by 
reference to underlying purpose or with language which inade-
quately mirrors the understood intentions of the drafters. For 
almost two generations, the Convention's limits on liability have 
been translatable into domestic currency values by application of 
225. Since 1981, SDRs have been calculated by reference to the national currencies of 
five members (the United States dollar, the West German mark, the French franc, the 
Japanese yen, and British pound sterling). Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conven-
tions: Some Clarifications, 13 J. MAR. L. & COMM. l, 3 (1981). Each currency is assigned a 
percentage weight in determining the value of one SDR. Id. 
226. 690 F .2d at 310. Substitution of the SDR for the franc under the Convention was 
supported by the United States but there has been considerable opposition to the proposal 
by signatories to the Convention who are not members of the International Monetary Fund. 
At the time of the Second Circuit's decision in Franklin Mint few signatories had ratified the 
Montreal Protocol. Id. The United States Senate has since expressly rejected it. See infra 
text accompanying note 234. 
227. 690 F.2d at 310. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 310-11. 
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a clear and easily applied formula. An essential ·ingredient of 
that formula has, as a consequence of international action fol-
lowed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist. What the parties 
ask us to do is to select, upon the basis of our judgment as to 
what is best as a matter of policy, a new unit of conversion. We 
are without authority to do so.230 
The Second Circuit was presented with an impediment 
neither anticipated nor treated by the contracting parties to the 
Warsaw Convention. The unforeseen impossibility of calculation 
under the Convention, and the relative roles of the three branches 
of the United States Government in the proposal, adoption, and in-
terpretation of treaties, led the court to declare the liability limits 
in the Warsaw Convention unenforceable in United States 
courts.231 The court's ruling is prospective only. "Prospective ef-
fect is compelled by the fact that this is the first case in which a 
court has declined to enforce the Convention's limits on liability .... 
Parties to transactions covered by the Convention should have 
time to adjust their affairs to this ruling." 232 For the purposes of 
the instant case, and all cases based on events creating liability 
that occur within sixty days after the court's ruling, the last offi-
cial price of gold in the United States was selected by the court to 
calculate the limit on liability. 233 
Two questions are left unanswered by the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Franklin Mint. First, will the refusal to enforce the liability 
limits with regard to property damage or loss be extended to per-
sonal injury actions? The court's rationale for refusing to enforce 
the liability limits in suits for injury to property would appear to 
be equally compelling when applied to the Convention's limits for 
injury to the person because both are measured by the same unit, 
the "Poincare" franc, under Article 22. Recent Senate action adds 
support to this conclusion. 
On March 8, 1983, the United States Senate rejected the Mon-
treal Protocol despite the fact that the Protocol had been sup-
ported by the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations.234 Opposi-
tion to the Protocol in the Senate apparently was based upon the 
230. Id. at 311. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 312. 
233. Id. 
234. 129 CONG. REC. 82279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983); New York Times, March 9, 1983 at 
06, col. 5. 
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low limits of liability and the bar against negligence suits contain-
ed in the Protocol.235 Thus, the refusal of the Second Circuit to 
adopt the SDR as the appropriate unit of account under the War-
sa w Convention, based upon Senate inaction concerning the Mon-
treal Protocol, now finds additional justification in the Senate's re-
jection. 
The more complex question created by the Second Circuit's 
decision in Franklin Mint is whether plaintiffs retain rights to sue 
under the Warsaw Convention absent an enforceable limit to 
defendant's liability. The court expressly refused to rule on the 
enforceability of those articles in the Convention that create 
liability. 
Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of con-
version, it might be argued that the Convention has been 
abrogated. However, treaties involve international obligations 
entered into by coordinate branches of the government and it is 
not the province of courts to declare treaties abrogated or to af-
ford relief to those ... who wish to escape their terms. These are 
not matters for "judicial cognizance." They belong to the ex-
ecutive and legislative departments because they are more pro-
perly the domain of "diplomacy and legislation, ... not ... the ad-
ministration of laws."236 
Thus, the Second Circuit's opinion in Franklin Mint raises more 
questions than it answers, and in light of the drastic consequences of 
the Second Circuit's opinion, it is not surprising that the United 
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the case. 
The current role of the Warsaw Convention in United States avia-
tion litigation clearly requires further definition. Ultimately, the 
executive branch may be required to seek renegotiation of the 
liability limits to a level acceptable to the United States Senate. 
V. "OF THEIR CHOICE"-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
TITLE VII AND UNITED STATES TREATY OBLIGATIONS: 
AVIGLIANO V. SUMITOMO SHOJI AMERICA, INC. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a treaty-
based237 attempt by an American subsidiary of a foreign corpora-
235. New York Times, supra note 234. The Protocol would increase liability from 
$75,000 to $110,000 per passenger but would bar lawsuits against airlines for negligence or 
misconduct. 
236. 690 F.2d at 311, n. 26 (citations omitted). 
237. An American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation moved to dismiss plaintiffs' ac-
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tion to avoid compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964238 in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. 239 The court 
held that American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations may 
claim rights under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) between the United States and Japan240 (U.S.-
Japan Commercial Treaty), but that the Treaty does not provide 
immunity from American discrimination laws.241 The United States 
Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision,242 holding that 
the defendant American subsidiary was not a company of Japan 
and, therefore, could not invoke the rights claimed under the 
U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty.243 Because the Supreme Court did 
not reach the issue of the relationhip between treaty rights under 
the U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty and United States employment 
discrimination laws, an examination of the Second Circuit's 
analysis of that issue is appropriate for this Survey. 
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit under Title VIl,244 against 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. (Sumitomo), alleging that 
Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese nationals for 
management positions discriminated against them on the basis of 
nationality and gender.245 Sumitomo, a New York-incorporated, 
tion claiming immunity from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e 
(1976 & Supp. 1981), under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, done April 
2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.l.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143 (effective 
Oct. 30, 1953) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty]. 
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
239. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
240. U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty, supra note 237. 
241. 638 F.2d at 558. 
242. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
243. Id. at 189. 
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin: or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. 
245. Plaintiffs alleged discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), as well as 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' § 1981 
claim and found that the Thirteenth Amendment claim had been abandoned. Avigliano v. 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modified, 638 F.2d 552 (2d 
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
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wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese firm, moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the U .S.-J a pan Commercial 
Treaty exempts United States-incorporated, wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries of Japanese trading companies from the application of Ti-
tle Vll.246 The district court denied Sumitomo's motion, holding 
that the U .S-J a pan Commercial Treaty was not intended to pro-
tect the employment practices of Japanese subsidiaries incor-
porated in the United States.247 Upon Sumitomo's request, the 
district court certified for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1292(b). The Second Circuit held that Sumitomo could invoke the 
U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty provisions,248 thus raising the ques-
tion of whether the Treaty provided immunity from Title VII. 
Article VIII(l) of the U .S.-J a pan Commercial Treaty provides 
in pertinent part: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall 
be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, ... 
executive personnel ... of their choice ."249 The problem facing the 
Second Circuit was how to reconcile the conflict between the 
Treaty's Article VIII(l) "of their choice" language with the pro-
scription against employment discrimination in Title VII. 250 The 
246. 473 F. Supp. 506, 512-13. 
247. Id. 
248. 638 F.2d at 569. This specific holding was reversed by the Supreme Court. 
Su~itomo Shoji America, Inc., v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). Judge Mansfield, writing for 
the Second Circuit Court, held that the place of incorporation is not determinative of 
whether a corporation could invoke rights under the Treaty. 638 F.2d at 555-56. Plaintiffs 
had argued that because three articles in the Treaty explicitly granted rights to subsidi-
aries and article VII, the section relevant to the controversy here (see discussion at note 
256, infra), contained no such explicit grant, that article did not apply to subsidiaries. The 
Second Circuit rejected this interpretation of the Treaty. Id. at 556. The court found it 
"unlikely that the parties to the Treaty would have agreed to grant each other broad rights 
to establish and manage subsidiaries abroad in Article VII, and then gone on to bar those 
same subsidiaries from invoking almost all of the substantive provisions which the Treaty 
contains." Id. The purpose of the Treaty, its "unitary structure," the Treaty's legislative 
history, and the construction of other Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties to 
which the United States is a party lent support to the court's determination that Sumitomo 
could claim rights under Article VIII of the Treaty. Id. at 556-58. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion that a locally-incorpo-
rated subsidiary of a Japanese corporation is covered under Art. VIII of the Treaty. Spiess 
v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982). 
The court disagreed with the Second Circuit on the effect of the Treaty on Title VII. Id. See 
infra text accompanying notes 255-261. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed in light of the plain meaning of the lan-
guage in Article VIII of the Treaty, the intent of the parties to the Treaty, the purpose of 
the Treaty, and the current position of the parties to the Treaty on this issue. 457 U.S. 176. 
249. U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty, supra note 237, art. VIII(l) (emphasis added). 
250. See supra note 244. 
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court held that "[t]he right of Japanese firms operating in the 
United States under the Treaty to hire executives 'of their choice' 
does not give them license to violate American laws prohibiting 
discrimination in employment."251 
The court began its analysis by focusing on the "of their 
choice" language of Article VIII(l) and concluded that the 
background of the Treaty does not support an expansive inter-
pretation of this language: 
At the time when the Treaty was negotiated, a number of 
American states and many foreign countries severely restricted 
the employment of noncitizens within their boundaries .... The 
provision in Article VIII of the Treaty allowing companies of 
either party to engage executive personnel "of their choice" ... 
was a reaction to those restrictions. It was primarily intended to 
exempt companies operating abroad from local legislation 
restricting the employment of noncitizens.252 
The court found no intent of the parties to grant a right to 
discriminate. An interpretation of the "of their choice" language 
allowing such a right would, in the court's opinion, "immunize a 
party not only from Title VII but also, from laws prohibiting 
employment of children, ... laws granting rights to unions and 
employees, ... and the like."253 
In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 254 a case raising the iden-
tical legal issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved the 
conflict between Article VIII(l) of the Treaty and Title VII in a 
manner contrary to the decision reached by the Second Circuit in 
A vigliano. The court in Spiess held that the Treaty exempted a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation from employ-
ment discrimination laws in the hiring of Japanese nationals for 
certain managerial positions. 255 The court based its opinion on the 
following criteria: preservation of the meaning of Article VIll(l) of 
the Treaty,256 the grant of absolute rights in other Treaty 
251. 638 F .2d at 558. 
252. Id. at 558-59. 
253. Id. at 559 (citations omitted). 
254. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981). 
255. Id . at 355. Before reaching this issue the Fifth Circuit decided, as did the Second 
Circuit, that a locally-incorporated subsidiary, wholly-owned by a Japanese corporation, 
could invoke Article VIII of the Treaty. See supra note 248. 
256. Id. at 362. 
Clearly, article VIIl(l) provides some right to Japanese companies to manage their 
own affairs. It is irrelevant whether the source of potential interference with that 
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articles, 257 the views of a State Department expert on commercial 
treaties,258 the legislative history of the Treaty,259 and rules of 
statutory construction.260 
Id. 
right is state legislation characterized as "ultranationalistic" or a federal statute 
labeled "progressive." The right of Japanese companies to choose essential per-
sonnel is a right to maintain Japanese control of the overseas investment. To make 
this right subject to Title VII's [bona fide occupational qualification] requirements, 
or to interpret it to override only state law, would render its inclusion in the Trea-
ty virtually meaningless. 
257. Id. at 360-61. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that an overriding 
goal of the Parties to the Treaty was to provide national treatment to foreign businesses 
operating in the host country. The Fifth Circuit read Article VIII as establishing an ab-
solute right beyond national treatment: 
This is accentuated by the fact that the phrase "nationals of either Party shall be 
accorded national treatment" appears repeatedly in other provisions of the Trea-
ty. Considering the Treaty as a whole, the only reasonable interpretation is that 
Article VIII(l) means exactly what it says: Companies have a right to decide which 
executives ... will manage their investment in the host country, without regard to 
host country laws. 
Id. at 361. 
258. Id. The court relied heavily on the views of Herman Walker who, according to the 
State Department, formulated the modern concept of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion treaties and negotiated many of them for the United States. Id. at 357, n.2. Mr. 
Walker's views on these treaties and provisions akin to Article VIII are contained in three 
articles: Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. 
REV. 805 (1958); Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-
ment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); Walker, Provisions on 
Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956). 
259. 643 F.2d at 361-62. The court cited Senate subcommittee hearings to demonstrate 
that the Senate was concerned that American companies have the right to use American 
personnel to control their investments in Japan. Commercial Treaties-Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce & Navigation, with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
Germany and Japan: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, 6-9 (1953). The court determined that it was "self-evident 
that this same goal of American negotiators in formulating Article VIIl(l) was the goal of 
Japanese negotiators who sought it to protect Japanese companies operating in the United 
States." 643 F .2d at 362. 
260. The court applied the following, generally accepted rule of interpretation for 
reconciling Treaty and domestic legal obligations: 
The general rule is that subsequent federal legislation will invalidate treaty obli-
gations if the congressional intent to do so is clearly expressed. No evidence sug-
gests that Congress intended to repudiate Article VIII(l) when it enacted Title 
VII. Domestic employment discrimination laws occupy a high priority on the na-
tion's agenda, and courts often resolve statutory conflicts in their favor. In this 
case, however, resolving doubts in favor of Title VII would go beyond the judicial 
sphere of interpretation. In the absence of congressional guidance, we decline to 
abrogate the American government's solemn undertaking with respect to a 
foreign nation. 
Id. at 362 (citations omitted). 
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Having held that Sumitomo, as a subsidiary of a foreign cor-
poration, could claim rights under the U .S.-J a pan Commercial 
Treaty and that such rights did not include freedom from the stric-
tures of Title VII, the Second Circuit in A vigliano briefly examin-
ed the application of Title VII to Sumitomo's hiring practices. This 
aspect of the decision may be the most significant for foreign-
owned companies doing business in the United States. Recogniz-
ing that the "of their choice" clause was intended to "facilitate a 
party's employment of its own nationals to the extent necessary to 
insure its operational success in the host country ,"261 the Second 
Circuit noted that "Title VII, construed in light of the Treaty, 
would not preclude the company from employing Japanese na-
tionals in positions where such employment is reasonably 
necessary to the successful operation of its business."262 Thus, the 
object of the Treaty could be accomplished without exemption 
from Title VII by reference to the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) exception of Title VII.263 Although the United States 
Supreme Court has held that Title VII's BFOQ exception must be 
narrowly construed,264 the Second Circuit stated that, as applied to 
a Japanese company enjoying rights under the Treaty, the BFOQ 
exception must be "construed in a manner that will give due 
weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a J ap-
anese company doing business in the United States."265 
The Second Circuit set out four relevant factors in this con-
text: "(1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of 
Japanese products, markets, customs and business practices, 
(3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or 
parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons 
with whom the company or branch does business."266 Only the 
fourth factor, customer acceptability, appears to depart in a major 
way from current standards for defining BFOQs.267 
261. 638 F.2d at 552, 559. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. Title VII provides in relevant part: 
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and 
employ employees, ... on the basis of ... national origin in those certain instances 
where ... origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... " 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). 
264. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
265. 638 F.2d at 559. 
266. Id. 
267. United States corporations have been unsuccessful in arguing that hiring prac-
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The Supreme Court's determination that the U.S.-Japanese 
Commercial Treaty does not encompass United States-incorp-
orated, wholly-owned Japanese subsidiaries rendered unnecessary 
any determination of the relationship between the Treaty and 
Title VII. With the rapid proliferation of foreign-owned companies 
doing business in the United States, the Court is likely to be faced 
with the question in the future. Because the FCN's268 to which the 
United States is a party do not provide a clear answer in their 
language, spirit, or negotiating history, the question is likely to be 
difficult to resolve. 
Three answers immediately suggest themselves. First, a 
determination that United States employment discrimination laws 
must give way to the nation's Treaty obligations. This resolution 
would help create a healthy legal environment for foreign invest-
ment in the United States. Numerous consequences of an expan-
sive interpretation of the "of their choice" clauses in commerical 
treaties suggest, however, that this resolution is unacceptable. 
First, it is difficult to perceive how the "of their choice" language 
can be read to exempt foreign employers from the strictures of 
Title VII and not from other laws regulating employment prac-
tices. Second, the FCN's are intended to assure national treatment 
to foreign companies, that is, the same rights and duties under law 
as the host country's companies enjoy. Such an expansive reading 
of the Article VIII "of their choice" language would offer foreign 
companies better treatment than U.S. companies enjoy. Freeing 
foreign companies from regulations binding national companies 
would give a competitive advantage, rather than equal treatment, 
to foreign companies. 
A second resolution of the tension between the treaty lan-
guage and domestic civil rights law would be to give an ascendant 
position to the latter. Requiring foreign-owned companies to meet 
the obligations imposed upon domestic companies in their employ-
ment practices would preserve and enhance the social values re-
flected in the civil rights laws. Nevertheless, requiring foreign-
owned companies to comply with U.S. civil rights laws, while 
clearly a valid act of legislative jurisdiction, potentially dissuades 
tices based on customer preferences are not proscribed by Title VII. Diaz v. Pan Am World 
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
268. The United States has Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties in force 
with at least 49 nations. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 
9136, TREATIES IN FORCE (1981). 
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such companies from investing in the United States. Additionally, 
binding foreign-owned companies to the full legal obligations 
created by U.S. domestic legislation potentially encourages other 
nations to follow suit, thus subjecting American companies doing 
business abroad to domestic employment obligations in the host 
country. 
The Second Circuit's resolution of the apparent conflict be-
tween the Treaty language and the civil rights laws avoided the 
problems inherent in elevating one source of legal obligation over 
the other. By defining the scope of the "of their choice" language 
in a manner compatible with Title VII, the court preserved the in-
terests of the foreign-owned company by acknowledging that in 
certain key positions, nationality may be a relevant consideration 
in employment. In addition, the court preserved the essential func-
tion of Title VII by holding that such companies are subject to the 
obligations of U.S. civil rights laws. 
VL THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT CASES 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)269 
reflects four congressional goals: first, the Act codifies the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity;210 second, it transfers immunity 
determinations from the executive branch to the judicial branch;211 
third, it provides in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state;272 
and finally, it also provides a post-judgment procedure to aid in 
269. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1330; 1332(a)(2)-(4); 1391(f); 1441(d); 1602-1611 (1976)). 
270. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 6604. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity recognizes immunity as a 
defense only where the suit arose out of the public acts of a foreign state. Where the suit 
arose out of a foreign state's commercial acts the defense is unavailable. The United States 
implicitly adopted this theory of sovereign immunity in 1952 when the State Department in-
dicated that it would no longer suggest immunity from claims arising out of the commercial 
acts of a foreign state. Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, 
to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. 984-85 (1952). 
271. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS at 6606. Prior to the FSIA, either the court or the defendant sought the views of 
the State Department as to whether immunity was available as a defense to suit in United 
States courts. Although not binding on the court, the State Department's suggestion usual-
ly was followed. Congress' purpose in transferring immunity decisions to the judiciary was 
to "[reduce] the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and [assure] litigants 
that these often crucial decisions would be made on purely legal grounds and under pro-
cedures that insure due process." Id. 
272. 28 u .s.c. § 1330(b) (1976). 
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satisfying judgments against foreign states.273 "[A] marvel of com-
pression,"274 the FSIA, "[t]hrough a series of intricately coor-
dinated provisions,"275 establishes the availability of the defense of 
sovereign immunity, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, and the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 
The grant of original subject matter jurisdiction in the 
federal district court extends to non-jury276 civil actions against a 
foreign state if that state is not entitled to immunity from the 
claim.277 Statutory in personam jurisdiction exists when the state 
is not entitled to immunity and has been properly served.278 Since 
the existence of both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction 
are dependent upon the lack of sovereign immunity from the 
claim, the determination of the availability of immunity is a 
predicate inquiry. An initial understanding of the FSIA's immuni-
ty provisions requires an appreciation of two features of the Act. 
First, the FSIA provides that, subject to any international agree-
ment to which the United States was a party in 1976, foreign 
states are immune from suit in United States courts. 279 Second, the 
FSIA provides for significant exceptions which, in practice, nearly 
consume the general rule of immunity.280 
During the Survey years, the Second Circuit decided two 
cases raising complex issues under the FSIA. 281 In resolving these 
issues, the court made a significant contribution to a general ap-
preciation of Congress' intent in passing the FSIA and to an 
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1976). 
274. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306, 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
275. Id. 
276. The Second Circuit was called upon to interpret the effect and constitutionality of 
the bar to jury trials in this grant in Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Va pores "Inca Ca pa 
Yupanqui", 369 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981). See Youngblood, 1980 Survey of International Law 
in the Second Circuit, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L.& COM. 159, 221 (1980). 
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). 
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1608. The effect of the dual requirement of lack of immunity and 
proper service to achieve in personam jurisdiction means that the appearance of a foreign 
state in an action does not confer personal jurisdiction over the foreign state if the state en-
joys immunity from the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(c). The foreign state may waive its immuni-
ty, thus consenting to in personam jurisdiction over it. 
279. 28 u.s.c. § 1604. 
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l)-(5). 
281. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). 
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understanding of the complex interrelationship of the Act's three 
major components: immunity, subject matter, and personal juris-
diction. 
A. TEXAS TRADING & MILLING CORP. V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
NIGERIA 
In enacting the FSIA, Congress "put [its] faith in the U.S. 
courts to work out progressively, on a case-by-case basis ... the 
distinction between commercial and governmental"282 activity, a 
distinction crucial to the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign 
immunity. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Texas Trading) 283 represents the first major effort by a 
United States Court of Appeals to "apply systematically the 
FSIA's series of intricately coordinated provisions"284 and, par-
ticularly, the Act's commercial activity exception. The Second Cir-
cuit, in a well-reasoned opinion, justified Congress' faith in United 
States courts. 
In 1975, Nigeria embarked on a massive cement purchasing 
program to build its infrastructure. As part of this program, it ex-
ecuted over one hundred contracts with suppliers throughout the 
world for the purchase of more than sixteen million metric tons of 
cement. Four of the contracts were made with plaintiffs, New 
York corporations.285 Each contract required Nigeria to establish a 
confirmed, irrevocable letter of credit for the total amount due. 
Nigeria set up irrevocable letters of credit with the Central Bank 
of Nigeria, an instrumentality of the Nigerian government, and ad-
vised these letters through the Morgan Guaranty Company of 
New York.286 
The cement deliveries made pursuant to these contracts first 
strained, and later overwhelmed Nigeria's port at Lagos/Apapa. 
By July, over 400 ships were waiting to unload, 260 of them carry-
ing cement.287 Unable to accept delivery, Nigeria cabled its sup-
pliers and asked them to stop shipping cement. Central Bank in-
282. Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law & 
Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 
(1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State). 
283. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
284. Id. at 306. 
285. Id. at 303. 
286. Id. at 304. 
287. Id. at 305. 
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structed Morgan not to pay under the letters of credit unless the 
supplier submitted a statement from Central Bank that payment 
should be made. Morgan notified each supplier of Nigeria's in-
structions and then refused to make payments under the letters of 
credit. In December 1975, Nigeria prohibited the entry into 
Nigerian ports of any ship that had not secured a two month prior 
approval. Criminal penalties were imposed for unauthorized entry 
into the ports.288 
Cement suppliers sued Nigeria in courts throughout the 
world.289 The four plaintiffs in Texas Trading filed separate suits290 
against the Republic of Nigeria and the Central Bank in the 
federal district court for the Southern District of New York, alleg-
ing that Central Bank's changing the terms of payment under the 
letters of credit constituted an anticipatory breach of the cement 
contracts and the letters of credit. 
Nigeria and the Central Bank apparently did not seriously 
dispute these allegations.291 Rather, they challenged the court's 
jurisdiction under the FSIA. In one of the cases, Texas Trading, 
the trial judge found jurisdiction lacking;292 in the others, Nikkei, 
East Europe, and Chenax, the trial judge found jurisdiction pre-
sent.293 
Defendants appealed from the jurisdictional ruling and award 
in Nikkei, Chenax, and East Europe. Texas Trading appealed 
from the district court's jurisdictional ruling. The Second Circuit 
affirmed the jurisdictional holding in Nikkei, East Europe, and 
Chenax and reversed the jurisdictional holding in Texas 
Trading. 294 
Perhaps the most significant feature of Texas Trading is the 
structure used by the court to analyze "the three crucial questions 
in a suit against a foreign state: the availability of sovereign im-
munity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 306. 
290. Id. Decor by Nikkei International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Nikkei], Chenax 
Majesty, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Chenax], and East Europe Import-Export Inc. v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria [East Europe] were consolidated for trial. Texas Trading & 
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [Texas Trading] was decided separately and 
consolidated with the other three on appeal. 
291. 647 F.2d at 306. 
292. 500 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
293. 497 F. Supp. 893, 902-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
294. 647 F.2d at 316. 
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over the claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant."295 Identifying such an analytical structure where the 
commercial activity exception is in issue was no small accomplish-
ment because "the FSIA seems at first glance to make the answer 
to one of the questions, subject matter jurisdiction, dispositive of 
all three."296 The Second Circuit recognized the subtle but impor-
tant differences between these inquiries under the FSIA, and for-
mulated an analysis that insures that the separate considerations 
under the act are properly identified and evaluated. 
The court's analysis of the section 1605(a)(2) (commercial activity) 
exception is structured around five questions to be examined and 
answered seriatum. 
1. Does the conduct the action is based upon or related to 
qualify as "commercial activity"? 
2. Does that commercial activity bear the relation to the cause 
of action and to the United States described by one of the three 
phrases of§ 1605(a)(2), warranting the Court's exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a)? 
3. Does the exercise of this congressional subject matter 
jurisdiction lie within the permissible limits of the "judicial 
· power" set forth in Article III? 
4. Do subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a) and service 
under § 1608 exist, thereby making personal jurisdiction proper 
under § 1330(b)? 
5. Does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b) 
comply with the due process clause, thus making personal 
jurisdiction proper'?297 
According to the court, the first question presents "perhaps the 
most important decision a court faces in an FSIA suit."298 Despite 
the importance of the commercial activity inquiry, the FSIA pro-
vides no guidance as to the definition of commercial activity. The 
Act does, however, make clear that the characterization of an ac-
tivity as commercial is to be made by reference to the nature of 
the conduct or transaction rather than by reference to its 
purpose.299 The court examined three sources of authority to solve 
this definitional problem. First, the court turned to legislative 
295. Id. at 306. 
296. Id. 
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history.soo That history suggested that "if the activity is one in 
which a private person could engage, [the foreign state] is not en-
titled to immunity."soi Second, pre-FSIA case law was examined.s02 
Finally, the court turned to international law to add content to the 
commercial activity exception, and concluded that there was little 
doubt that international law followed the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.sos Unfortunately, the court did not identify 
the particular role played by international law in defining the con-
tent of the commercial activity exception. 
After examining these sources, the court concluded that the 
cement contracts and letters of credit were commercial activities 
engaged in by Nigeria. 
"If a government department goes into the marketplaces of the 
world and buys boots or cement- as a commercial trans-
action - that government department should be subject to all the 
rules of the marketplace." Nigeria's activity here is in the nature 
of a private contract for the purchase of goods. Its purpose -to 
build roads, army barracks, whatever - is irrelevant. 304 
The court then turned to the second inquiry: whether the ac-
tivity bears the necessary relationship to the cause of action and the 
United States, sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.305 The 
court immediately identified the third clause of section 1605(a)(2)306 as 
providing the necessary basis of subject matter jurisdiction. That 
clause requires that the action be based "upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere [that act causing] a direct ef-
fect in the United States."307 In Texas Trading the precise issue 
300. Id. at 309. 
301. Id. 
302. Id . at 309-10. 
303. Id. at 310. 
304. Id., (quoting Trendtex Trading Corp. v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W .L.R. 
356, 369, 1 All E.R. 881). 
305. Id. at 310. 
306. § 1605(a)(2) provides: 
(a). A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere 
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was whether there was a direct effect in the United States; the 
court held that there was such an effect. 308 In reaching this conclu-
sion the court looked to case law discussing direct effects on 
natural persons, 309 and analogized to the kinds of effects that 
might be directly felt by juridical persons. 310 Recognizing that the 
task of identifying and locating the injury to a corporation can be 
difficult, the court concluded that the plaintiff corporations were 
directly affected by the financial loss they suffered as a result of 
defendant's breach of contract.311 Two facts supported a finding 
that this direct effect occurred in the United States, as required 
by the third clause of section 1605(a)(2). First, those who supplied ce-
ment to Nigeria were to present the required documents and col-
lect money in the United States and the suppliers were precluded 
from so doing by the alleged breach. Second, each of the plaintiffs 
was an American corporation.312 The presence of both factors in 
the instant case satisfied the requirements of section 1605(a)(2). The 
court refused to discuss whether either one alone would have suf-
ficed.313 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the court's discussion 
of section 1605(a)(2) is its articulation of the spirit in which a section 
1605(a)(2) analysis should be pursued. 
Courts construing [the terms "direct" and "in the United 
States"] should be mindful more of Congress's concern with pro-
viding "access to the courts" to those aggrieved by the commer-
cial acts of a foreign sovereign than with cases defining "direct" 
or locating effects under state statutes passed for dissimilar pur-
poses. . . . Congress in the FSIA certainly did not intend 
significantly to constrict jurisdiction; it intended to regularize it. 
The question is, was the effect sufficiently "direct" and suffi-
ciently "in the United States" that Congress would have wanted 
an American court to hear the case? No rigid parsing of 
§ 1605(a)(2) should lose sight of that purpose.314 
The court quickly resolved the third relevant inquiry: 
308. 637 F .2d at 313. 
309. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Upton v. Em-
pire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 




314. Id. at 312-13. 
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whether there is a constitutional basis for the statutory grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction.315 Since each suit was between a 
citizen of a state and a foreign state; the suits fell within the diver-
sity grant.316 
The statutory validity of personal jurisdiction also was not 
difficult to establish in the instant case. Since section 1330(b) pro-
vides for personal jurisdiction as to any claim over which the court 
has power under section 1330(a) so long as process has been served 
under section 1608, the court simply recognized that service had 
been made and no objection to it had been raised by defendants.317 
The final analysis, whether the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion in this case satisfied constitutional requirements, was more 
difficult of resolution. The court began by inquiring whether the 
dictates of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment apply 
to FSIA cases. Following its own precedent, the court concluded 
that it did.318 The court therefore applied a minimum contacts 
analysis as required by International Shoe v. Washington 319 and 
later refined in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 320 In 
considering whether minimum contacts existed in the instant case 
the court first inquired: whose contacts, and with what?321 The 
court concluded that the relevant contacts were not only those of 
defendants, but also those of defendants' agent. Thus, Central 
Bank's and Morgan's activities were charged to Nigeria.322 Since 
service was made pursuant to section 1608, the area in which con-
tacts were to be measured was the entire United States.323 The court 
then articulated the precise inquiry to determine whether these 
contacts met the constitutional minimum. 
[T]he court must examine the extent to which defendants availed 
315. See supra text at note 297. 
316. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
317. 647 F.2d at 313. 
318. Id. Cases discussing the issue are rare largely because most pre-FSIA cases were 
based on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Until the United States Supreme Court decided Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), it was not clear that the due process clause operated to 
restrict the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The Second Circuit had held that, even 
where jurisdiction is quasi-in-rem, foreign states are entitled to due process scrutiny of the 
court's jurisdiction over them. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne 
de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979). 
319. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
320. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
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themselves of the privileges of American law, the extent to 
which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to 
them, the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the United 
States and the countervailing interest of the United States in 
hearing the suit. 324 
The court had no trouble finding "purposeful availment" in the in-
stant case. Central Bank's activities, in particular, suggested such 
availment.325 The same activities supported the conclusion that 
defendants had invoked the benefits and protections of American 
law. The court reasoned that Nigeria and Central Bank "would 
have every 'reason to expect to be haled before a ... court' 
here."326 Not only had defendants threatened litigation327 but they 
had been notified by Morgan of the likelihood of suit by the ce-
ment contractors.328 The court similarily concluded that litigation 
in the United States was not unduly inconvenient for defendants 
and that the United States had an interest in providing a means of 
redress for its residents. 329 
B. VERLINDEN B. V. V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 330 arose out of the 
same cement contract crisis that lay the factual background of 
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.331 
Verlinden is a Dutch corporation that contracted with Nigeria to 
ship cement under the terms of a letter of credit nearly identical 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 314-15. Among these activities were: sending its employees to New York for 
training; keeping large cash balances in New York; maintaining a custody account there; 
regularly advising letters of credit through Morgan; and using Morgan as its means of pay-
ing bills throughout the world. The activities of Central Bank in relation to the cement con-
tracts were particularly relevant. 
Id. 
In Nigeria's behalf and on Nigeria's instructions, Central Bank advised each of the 
letters of credit through Morgan in the United States, regardless of the individual 
supplier's wishes. Having chosen American law and process as their protectors, 
Nigeria and Central Bank were not hesitant to invoke them; at the mere hint 
Morgan was reluctant to honor defendants' amendments to the letters of credit, an 
officer of Central Bank threatened to "go to court" to enforce them. 
326. Id. at 315 (quoting Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 216 (1977)). 
327. See supra note 325. 
328. 647 F.2d at 315. 
329. Id. 
330. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cfr. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). 
331. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
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to those established in favor of the plaintiffs in Texas Trading.332 
Verlinden sued the Central Bank of Nigeria in the Southern 
District of New York for anticipatory breach of an irrevocable let-
ter of credit.333 Central Bank of Nigeria did not seriously dispute 
its breach. Rather, Central Bank moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction under the FSIA.334 The district court determined that 
Central Bank was entitled to immunity and granted the motion.335 
The Second Circuit affirmed on a different basis, holding that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.336 
The court analyzed the subject matter jurisdiction question 
on two levels. Initially, it considered whether the FSIA granted 
subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action between a foreign 
plaintiff and a foreign state defendant.337 Second, it considered 
whether Article III of the United States Constitution permitted 
such a grant.338 
Because section 1330(a), the grant of subject matter jurisdiction 
in the FSIA, did not identify the required citizenship of the plain-
tiff, the court examined the Act's legislative history and concluded 
that Congress had not manifested a specific intention as to the 
matter.339 The court concluded, on the basis of the broad statutory 
332. 647 F.2d at 322. Under the terms of the letter of credit, Verlinden could collect, 
upon presentation of specified documents, $60 per ton of cement shipped to Nigeria. 
Verlinden subcontracted with a third party to purchase 240,000 tons of cement at $51 per 
ton. In the subcontract, Verlinden agreed to pay the third party $5 per ton if Verlinden 
reneged on the purchase. Id. 
333. The alleged anticipatory breach was based on the same conduct by Nigeria as had 
formed the basis of the breach claim in Texas Trading. See supra notes 283-290. Verlinden 
sought $4.66 million in damages for lost profits and the money it was forced to pay the third 
party under the terms of the subcontract. 647 F.2d at 323. 
334. 647 F.2d at 323. 
335. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 498 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y 1980), rev'd, 
647 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). 
336. 647 F.2d at 322. 
337. Id. at 323-24. 
338. Id. at 324-30. 
339. Id. at 323-24. The court characterized the legislative history as "murky and confus-
ed." Id. at 324. The House Judiciary Committee Report contained references to "our 
citizens," "U.S. businessmen" and "American property owners," thus suggesting that 
§ 1330(a) was intended to serve as a jurisdictional base only in suits brought by United 
States citizens. House Judiciary Committee, Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits 
Against Foreign States, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604, 6605. Congress also emphasized that it did not intend "to 
open up our courts to all comers to litigate any dispute which any private party may have 
with a foreign state anywhere in the world." Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Sub-
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language granting jurisdiction over "any non-jury civil action 
against a foreign state," that the classification of parties under 
section 1330(a) included both foreign plaintiffs and foreign state de-
fendants. 340 
Having so held, the court was required to determine the con-
stitutionality of a congressional grant of jurisdiction over a suit 
between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign state defendant. The trial 
judge had determined that the case fell within Article III because 
it arose out of federal law.341 The Second Circuit began its analysis, 
not with federal question jurisdiction, but with diversity jurisdic-
tion holding that Article Ill's diversity grant did not embrace a 
suit between two foreign parties.342 Thus, Congress lacked the 
authority to grant such jurisdiction to the federal courts on the 
basis of diversity. 
The court then turned to the availability of the federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Beginning with an examination of the statutory 
grant of jurisdiction over federal question cases found in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331,343 the court distinguished three types of cases: cases involv-
ing a cause of action created by federal law,344 cases where plain-
tiff's case requires an interpretation of federal law,345 and cases in-
volving the imposition of federal common law where the court 
finds "a national interest so strong that a judge-made federal rule 
committee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976). 
The court also found support for a congressional intent not to limit the FSIA's jurisdic-
tional grant to suits brought by Americans. 647 F.2d at 324. This intent was evidenced not 
only in statements in congressional hearings but also by the removal provision within the 
FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which is not limited to suits brought by U.S. citizens. 
340. 647 F.2d at 324. 
341. 488 F. Supp. at 1291-92. The trial judge held that the case arose out of federal law 
because the FSIA injected "an essential federal element into all suits brought against 
foreign states." Id. at 1292. 
342. 647 F.2d at 325. 
343. The court explained its choice to focus on the statutory language prior to a con-
sideration of the nearly identical language of Article III. 
The federal courts have had little opportunity to construe the crucial language of 
the phrase, "arising under ... the Laws of the United States," mainly because the 
passage in 1875 of the predecessor to§ 1331 made direct resort to the Constitution 
unnecessary. A huge body of law interprets the statute. It is, therefore, to the 
almost identical words in § 1331- "arises under the ... laws ... of the United 
States"-to which we first turn in exploring whether Verlinden's suit "arises 
under" federal law for purposes of Article III. 
Id. at 325. 
344. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
345. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
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of decision preempts the state law that would otherwise govern 
the case."346 
The court had little trouble concluding the FSIA suits were 
not of the first or third type.347 Seeming to acknowledge FSIA 
suits were more akin to the second type, the court nonetheless 
concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not require an interpreta-
tion of the FSIA.348 
[T]he issue of sovereign immunity is not disclosed by Verlinden's 
well-pleaded complaint. That complaint alleges the breach of a 
letter of credit, simpliciter. The Act retains sovereign immunity 
as a defense, to be raised by the defendant. Defenses that have 
to be raised affirmatively, no matter how urgent their federal 
nature, do not confer jurisdiction.349 
Nor do FSIA suits fall into the narrow category of cases where 
federal jurisdiction is held to be present because plaintiff's com-
plaint revealed the necessity of construing a federal statute con-
ferring substantive rights. 350 In Smith v. Kansas City Title & 
Trust Co. ,351 the United States Supreme Court held "where it ap-
pears from [plaintiff's complaint] that the right to relief depends 
upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely color-
able, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court 
has jurisdiction under [the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331]."352 The 
issue in Smith involved the validity of a congressional authoriza-
tion of farm loan bonds. The plaintiff sought an injunction against 
the defendant bank to prohibit it from investing in bonds that had 
been issued by Federal Land Banks under the authority of the 
346. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
347. 647 F.2d at 326. Inclusion in the first group was precluded by§ 28 U.S.C. § 1606 
which provides that in FSIA suits, "the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and 
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." The court noted, 
"There is no intent here to create new federal causes of action; the purpose of the Act in-
stead is to provide 'access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes."' 647 
F.2d at 326 (citations omitted). 
As to the inclusion of the instant case in the third group, the court simply concluded 
that the required strength of federal interest was not met. Id. 
348. 647 F.2d at 326. 
349. Id. at 326-27, citing Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 
(1908). 
350. 647 F.2d at 327. 
351. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
352. Id. at 199. 
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Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.353 The gravamen of plaintiff's com-
plaint in Smith was that the Farm Loan Act did not validly grant 
the authority to issue the farm loan bonds. According to the 
Verlinden court, federal jurisdiction was held present in Smith 
and its progeny354 because there was a need to construe a statute 
conferring substantive rights. "While in none of those cases did a 
federal law create a cause of action, each suit required construc-
tion of a law which, in another posture, had the power to do so. 
The laws regulated conduct and created rights outside the court-
room."355 Although it calls for the construction of a federal statute, 
Verlinden is distinguished by the court because that statute, the 
FSIA, regulates judicial practice rather than conduct outside the 
courtroom. 356 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that section 1331's "arising 
under" language "occupies less than all of the ground staked out 
by the parallel phrase in Article IIl,"357 but concluded that the ins-
tant case did not "stand on the narrow strip that remains."358 By 
the enumeration of specific cases over which federal courts could 
exercise jurisdiction, the Framers intended to "exclude all ideas of 
more extensive authority."359 "The Framers created federal courts 
to protect, first, rights secured by the Constitution, and, second, 
rights created by federal law. They were concerned with the en-
forcement of uniformity in the interpretation of federal laws, but 
only insofar as those federal laws regulated conduct."360 
The court found a further problem, one that is created by the 
structure of Article Ill, with the argument that a case can "arise 
under" a jurisdictional statute. Section 2, cl. 1 of that article 
enumerates nine types of cases over which the federal judicial 
power extends.361 Finding a basis for jurisdiction over the instant 
353. Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916) (repealed). 
354. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Empresa Houndurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), 
vacated on other grounds, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
355. 647 F.2d at 327. 
356. Id. The court found Verlinden analogous to Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Skelly Oil called for an interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, 28 U .S.C. § 2201 but the Supreme Court found jurisdiction lacking because the right to 
be vindicated was state created and not a right arising under federal law. Id. at 673. 
357. 647 F.2d at 328. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. (citing A. Hamilton, The Federalist, No 83, at 519 (Putnam ed. 1888)). 
360. 647 F.2d at 329. 
361. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1 provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
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case based upon the presence of a federal question would, in ef-
fect, render the remaining types of cases superfluous. 362 The court 
concluded that in order to preserve meaning in the other case 
types, the federal question grant must be restricted to cases aris-
ing under a federal substantive law.363 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.364 It agreed with 
the lower courts' conclusion that the FSIA allows a foreign plain-
tiff to sue a foreign sovereign in United States courts, 365 but 
disagreed with the Second Circuit that this grant of jurisdiction 
violated Article III of the United States Constitution.366 The Court 
held that the federal question clause of Article III provides a con-
stitutional basis for the FSIA's grant of subject matter jurisdic-
tion here. Osborn v. Bank of the United States 361 was cited as 
supporting "a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, ac-
cording to which Congress may confer on the federal courts 
jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the 
application of federal law."368 The Court characterized the instant 
case as involving not a "mere speculative possibility that a federal 
question may arise" but questions of substantive federal law that 
are necessarily raised at the outset of the suit.369 
The Supreme Court reiterated that Article III federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is broader than the statutory grant in section 1331 and 
thus labeled as misplaced the Second Circuit's reliance on deci-
sions construing that statute. 370 In addition, the Court rejected the 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies be-
tween two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - be-
tween Citizens of different States;- between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
362. 647 F.2d at 329. The court noted specifically the effect of such an interpretation on 
the meaning and content of diversity jurisdiction. If a case could be brought in federal court 
under § 1332, the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal district courts, the 
jurisdiction so granted would be constitutionally supported not only by the diversity clause 
in Article Ill, § 2, cl. 1 but by the federal question clause as well. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). 
365. Id. at 1969. 
366. Id. at 1971. 
367. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
368. 103 S. Ct. at 1971. 
369. Id. 
370. Id . 
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Second Circuit's characterization of the FSIA as exclusively a 
jurisdiction-creating statute. 371 According to the Court, the 
jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA are but one part of a com-
prehensive scheme. 
The Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign im-
munity as an aspect of substantive federal law ... and applying 
those standards will generally require interpretation of 
numerous points of federal law .... That the inquiry into foreign 
sovereign immunity is labeled under the Act as a matter of 
jurisdiction does not affect the constitutionality of Congress' ac-
tion in granting federal courts jurisdiction over cases calling for 
application of this comprehensive regulatory scheme.372 
The Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination 
of whether the district court was correct in holding that none of 
the statutory exceptions to immunity are present in the instant 
case. 
The effect of the Second Circuit's holding in Verlinden would 
have been to send foreign plaintiffs suing foreign states to 
American state courts where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act is equally applicable.373 Congress, in enacting the FSIA, made 
clear its intent to create uniformity in the determination of 
sovereign immunity claims in order to offer consistent treatment 
to foreign sovereign defendants. In creating a comprehensive 
method through which to sue foreign state defendants in 
American courts, Congress sought to assure that foreign 
sovereigns would not be subjected to immunity determinations 
colored by the political passions of the day. This intent recognizes 
not only the interests of the foreign sovereign, but also the in-
terests of the United States Government. The United States' in-
terest is twofold: that the exercise of American judicial power 
should not needlessly complicate executive efforts at stable rela-
tions with other nations, and that the United States as defendant 
before foreign courts be treated in a uniform and fair manner. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly minimized this interest. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the interest and 
preserved it. 
371. Id. at 1972. 
372. Id. at 1973. 
373. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a) (1976). 
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VIL CONCLUSION 
International law, or the law that governs between States, has at 
times, like the common law within States, a twilight existence 
during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or 
justice, till at length the imprimature of the court attests its 
jural quality.374 
67 
The international law cases decided by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals during the 1981-82 Survey years raised as many 
questions as they answered. Thus, the enforceability of the 
damage limitations contained in the Warsaw Convention awaits 
determination by the United States Supreme Court. A definition 
of the relationship between the requirements of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, and the obligations of commercial treaties to 
which the United States is a party, awaits a case which precisely 
and necessarily presents the issue. The assignment, to the ex-
ecutive branch, of decisional power over determinations of the ap-
plicability of the political offense exemption contained in United 
States extradition treaties awaits congressional action. The cases 
surveyed above represent the process by which international law 
and legal concerns of the international community are woven into 
the fabric of American law. By carefully balancing the domestic in-
terests of the United States, and the interests of the international 
community, and more importantly, by recognizing that the in-
terests of the two often coincide, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during these Survey years has contributed to the continued 
advancement of that process. 
374. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934) (J. Benjamin Cardozo). 
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